External_System_1["External System/Zone 1"] -.- |Inter-Zone Collaboration| Secure_Inter-Zone_Collaboration["Secure Inter-Zone Collaboration Framework (SIZCF)"]

end

Secure_Inter-Zone_Collaboration -.- |Zone Federation & Trust Inheritance| ASKA_Zone

Secure_Inter-Zone_Collaboration -.- |Secure Communication| Multi-Channel_Network

Decentralized_Ledger["Decentralized Ledger"] -.- |Audit & Provenance| Group_I

Decentralized_Ledger -.- |Governance & Policy| ASKA_Hub

end

Diagram 1 Description:

Group I Subgraph: Contains the core elements from Patents 1, 2, 3, and 4, showing their interrelationships.

Patent 1: Focuses on the IES structure, highlighting its full-stack isolation and dynamic partitioning capabilities.
Patent 2: Emphasizes secure communication between IES instances and the role of the hierarchical security mesh.
Patent 3: Illustrates the multi-channel network and out-of-band firewall, crucial for external communication.
Patent 4: Shows the DTMS managing trust between IES instances based on input from the MSM.

ASKA Hub Subgraph: Depicts the central control point for the zone, highlighting its management and security oversight of Group I components.
Group VI Subgraph: Shows two key collaboration technologies (SHVS and Secure Data Enclaves) and their reliance on the secure foundation provided by Group I.
External Systems/Zones Subgraph: Represents external entities collaborating with the current ASKA zone through the SIZCF.
Decentralized Ledger: The ledger is loosely connected to both Group I and the ASKA Hub, highlighting its role in both security auditing/provenance and governance/policy management.

Key Connections:

ASKA Hub to Group I: Demonstrates how the Hub orchestrates and manages the core architectural elements.
Group I to Group VI: Shows how secure collaboration and data management depend on the foundational security provided by the isolated IES, secure communication, and multi-channel network.
Inter-Zone Collaboration: Highlights the SIZCF's role in connecting to external systems/zones while adhering to the zone's security policies and leveraging the multi-channel network.
Decentralized Ledger Integration: Shows how the ledger is vital for both auditing the core architecture and providing the foundation for governance and policy decisions.

Diagram 2:

graph LR

subgraph "ASKA System"

direction LR

subgraph "IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

IES1["IES 1 (Dedicated Resources)"]

IES2["IES 2 (Dedicated Resources)"]

IESn["... IES N"]

subgraph "IES 1 (Expanded - Patent 1)"

CPU1["Dedicated CPU"]

Memory1["Dedicated Memory"]

IO1["Dedicated I/O"]

NIC1["Network Interface"]

Zone1["Sub-Zone 1 (Mini-TRC)"]

Zone2["Sub-Zone 2 (Mini-TRC)"]

CPU1 --> ChildIES1["Child IES 1"]

Memory1 --> ChildIES1

IO1 --> ChildIES1

NIC1 --> ChildIES1

ChildIES1 --> Zone1

CPU1 --> ChildIES2["Child IES 2"]

Memory1 --> ChildIES2

IO1 --> ChildIES2

NIC1 --> ChildIES2

ChildIES2 --> Zone2

ChildIES1 -- "Capability-Augmented PCFS (P2)" --> ChildIES2

end

IES1 --> IES_1_Internal

IES2 -.- IECommunication

end

subgraph "Inter IES Communication (Patent 2)"

IECommunication["Capability-based PCFS Communication"]

IECommunication --> DataDiode["Data Diode (Unidirectional)"]

IECommunication ----> CapManager["Capability Manager"]

end

IES_Cluster --> IECommunication

subgraph "Master Security Mesh (MSM) (Patent 2)"

MSM["MSM (Hierarchical)"]

IES1 --> MSM

IES2 --> MSM

IESn --> MSM

end

subgraph "ASKA Hub"

Hub["ASKA Hub"] --> DTMS["DTMS (Patent 4)"]

Hub --> Orchestrator["Orchestrator (P1)"]

DTMS --> CapManager

end

IES_Cluster ----> Hub

MSM ----> Hub

end

style MSM fill:#ccf,stroke:#888

style IECommunication fill:#ccf,stroke:#888

Diagram 2 Description:

Patent 1: Modular Isolated Execution Stacks with Hierarchical Zones, Decentralized Trust Management, and Capability-Based Inter-Component Communication

Abstract: This invention discloses a secure computing architecture featuring Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES), enhanced with hierarchical Zones, decentralized trust management, and path-based inter-component communication. Each IES provides complete hardware-enforced isolation, encompassing dedicated processing, memory, input/output (I/O), and networking resources, preventing unauthorized access and lateral movement of threats. Within each IES, child IES instances are organized into a hierarchy of sub-zones, each associated with a localized Trust Root Configuration (mini-TRC) defining trust roots and policies for granular control. Inter-child-IES communication utilizes a capability-enhanced Packet Carried Forwarding State (PCFS) mechanism, enabling flexible, policy-driven data sharing and resource access. A dynamic partitioning mechanism adjusts child IES instance configurations based on real-time demands and policies, optimizing performance. A dedicated hardware Security Monitor enforces isolation and access control between child IES instances, while a distributed Resource Manager facilitates resource allocation based on zone-specific policies and resource availability, further leveraging a bandwidth reservation system for guaranteed resource access. This integrated approach establishes a robust and adaptable secure computing foundation.

Diagram 1:

graph TD

subgraph "Modular IES Instance (Patent 1)"

subgraph "Dedicated Hardware Resources"

CPU["CPU"]

Memory["Memory"]

Storage["Storage"]

NIC["Network Interface Card"]

IO["I/O Controller"]

end

subgraph "Secure Execution Environment"

Kernel["Secure Kernel"] --> |Loads & Manages| OS["Operating System"]

OS --> |Executes| Applications["Applications"]

Applications -.- |Secure UI Interaction-Patent 11| Secure_UI_Kernel["Secure UI Kernel"]

Applications -.- |Data Sharing-Patent 12| Secure_Data_Enclave["Secure Data Enclave"]

end

subgraph "Local Security Mesh"

Anomaly_Detection["Anomaly Detection Module"] --> |Alert| Isolation_Module["Isolation Module"]

Anomaly_Detection --> |Report| Security_Log["Security Log"]

Anomaly_Detection -.- |Telemetry| Master_Security_Mesh["Master Security Mesh (MSM)"]

end

subgraph "Dynamic Partitioning (Patent 1)"

Resource_Manager["Resource Manager"] --> |Dynamically Partitions| IES_Instance

Resource_Manager --> |Allocates Resources| Child_IES_1["Child-IES Instance 1"]

Resource_Manager --> |Allocates Resources| Child_IES_2["Child-IES Instance 2"]

Child_IES_1 -.- |Data DiodeBased IPC-Patent 2| Child_IES_2

Resource_Manager -.- |Real-time Monitoring| Secure_Execution_Environment

Resource_Manager -.- |Policy Updates| ASKA_Hub["ASKA Hub"]

end

CPU --> Kernel

Memory --> Kernel

Storage --> IO

NIC ----> Firewall["Hardware Firewall (Patent 3)"]

IO --> |Secure Access| Peripherals["Peripherals"]

Local_Security_Mesh -.- Secure_Execution_Environment

Dynamic_Partitioning -.- Secure_Execution_Environment

end

Diagram 1 Description:

Modular IES Instance (Patent 1): The top-level subgraph representing a single, self-contained IES instance.

Dedicated Hardware Resources: Subgraph showing the dedicated hardware components within each IES:

CPU: Central processing unit for the instance.
Memory: Physically isolated memory dedicated to the instance.
Storage: Dedicated storage resources for the instance.
NIC: Network Interface Card for secure network communication.
I/O Controller: Manages secure access to peripherals.

Secure Execution Environment: Subgraph depicting the software stack running within the isolated IES:

Secure Kernel: Loads and manages the operating system and enforces security policies.
Operating System: Provides a secure runtime environment for applications.
Applications: User-level software running within the IES.
Connections: Dashed lines connect "Applications" to the "Secure UI Kernel" (from Patent 11) and "Secure Data Enclave" (from Patent 20), showing how the core IES enables these functionalities.

Local Security Mesh: Subgraph showing the security monitoring within the IES:

Anomaly Detection Module: Monitors system behavior for anomalies.
Isolation Module: Isolates the IES in case of a detected anomaly.
Security Log: Records security events and alerts.
Connections: A dashed line represents telemetry data sent to the "Master Security Mesh" (from Patent 2).

Dynamic Partitioning (Patent 1): Subgraph illustrating dynamic partitioning capabilities:

Resource Manager: Monitors resource utilization, security metrics, and receives policy updates from the ASKA Hub to dynamically partition the IES into child-IES instances.
Child-IES Instances: Smaller, independent execution units within the main IES, each with allocated resources.
Connections: Dashed lines represent the connection to the ASKA Hub (for policy updates) and the Secure Execution Environment (for real-time monitoring data). The arrow between Child-IES instances represents secure communication via data diodes (Patent 2).

Other Connections:

Hardware to Kernel: Connections between CPU, Memory, and the Secure Kernel represent the direct hardware access required for the kernel to operate.
Storage and I/O: Connections between Storage, I/O Controller, and Peripherals illustrate secure access to peripheral devices.
Network to Firewall: The NIC connects to the Hardware Firewall (from Patent 3) for secure external communication.
Security and Dynamic Partitioning: Dashed lines connect the Local Security Mesh and Dynamic Partitioning components to the Secure Execution Environment, signifying their monitoring and management roles.

Diagram 2:

graph LR

subgraph "ASKA Endpoint (Example)"

direction LR

subgraph "Modular IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

IES_1["IES Instance 1 (Web Browser)"]

IES_2["IES Instance 2 (Email Client)"]

IES_3["IES Instance 3 (Document Editor)"]

IES_Parent["Parent IES (Dynamic Partitioning)"]

IES_1 --> IES_Parent

IES_2 --> IES_Parent

IES_3 --> IES_Parent

subgraph "Hardware Resources (Dedicated per IES)"

CPU["CPU"]

Memory["Memory"]

IO["I/O"]

Network["Network"]

CPU_1["CPU"] --> IES_1

Memory_1["Memory"] --> IES_1

IO_1["I/O"] --> IES_1

Network_1["Network"] --> IES_1

CPU_2["CPU"] --> IES_2

Memory_2["Memory"] --> IES_2

IO_2["I/O"] --> IES_2

Network_2["Network"] --> IES_2

CPU_3["CPU"] --> IES_3

Memory_3["Memory"] --> IES_3

IO_3["I/O"] --> IES_3

Network_3["Network"] --> IES_3

end

subgraph "Secure UI Kernel (Patent 11)"

UI_Kernel["Secure UI Kernel"]

UI_Kernel -.- |UI Interaction| IES_1

UI_Kernel -.- |UI Interaction| IES_2

UI_Kernel -.- |UI Interaction| IES_3

end

subgraph "HESE-DAR (Patent 24)"

HESE_DAR["HESE-DAR"]

HESE_DAR -.- |Secure Storage| IES_1

HESE_DAR -.- |Secure Storage| IES_2

HESE_DAR -.- |Secure Storage| IES_3

end

subgraph "Inter-IES Communication (Patent 2)"

Data_Diode["Data Diode"]

IES_1 --> Data_Diode --> IES_2

IES_2 --> Data_Diode --> IES_3

IES_1 -.-> Data_Diode -.-> IES_3

end

subgraph "External Communication (Patent 3)"

Firewall["Firewall"]

IES_1 --> Firewall --> Internet["Internet"]

IES_2 --> Firewall --> Internet

IES_3 --> Firewall --> Internet

end

subgraph "Master Security Mesh (Patent 2)"

MSM["MSM"]

IES_1 --> MSM

IES_2 --> MSM

IES_3 --> MSM

end

%% Positioning and Connections

Modular_IES_Cluster --- Secure_UI_Kernel

Modular_IES_Cluster --- HESE_DAR

Modular_IES_Cluster --- Inter_IES_Communication

Modular_IES_Cluster --- External_Communication

Modular_IES_Cluster --- Master_Security_Mesh

end

subgraph "ASKA Hub (Patents 4, 16)"

Hub["ASKA Hub (Resource Mgmt, DTMS)"] -.-> |Resource Allocation & Security Policies| Modular_IES_Cluster

end

subgraph "Decentralized Ledger (Patents 13, 15)"

Ledger["Decentralized Ledger"] -.-> |Auditing & Governance| ASKA_Hub

Ledger -.-> |Auditing & Provenance| Modular_IES_Cluster

end

Diagram 2 Description:

This diagram illustrates Patent 1 (Modular IES) within a broader ASKA Endpoint context, demonstrating its integration with other key ASKA technologies. The focus is on showcasing how multiple IES instances operate concurrently and securely within a single endpoint, each with dedicated resources and secure communication channels.

Endpoint Focus: The largest subgraph, "ASKA Endpoint," contains all components operating within a single endpoint device. This provides context for the IES cluster.

Modular IES Cluster (Patent 1): This subgraph depicts the core concept of the patent:

IES Instances: Three IES instances are shown, each dedicated to a specific application (Web Browser, Email Client, Document Editor). This exemplifies how different applications can run in isolated environments. Parent IES (Dynamic Partitioning): This visually represents the capability of a parent IES instance to be dynamically partitioned into child IES instances, enabling granular control and flexible resource allocation. Hardware Resources (Dedicated per IES): Each IES instance has its own dedicated set of hardware resources (CPU, Memory, I/O, Network), enforcing strong isolation.

Secure UI Kernel (Patent 11): Shows the secure UI kernel, which allows user interaction with the isolated IES instances without compromising security.

HESE-DAR (Patent 24): The Hardware-Enforced Secure Encrypted Enclave for Data at Rest is included, demonstrating how data stored by each IES instance can be securely encrypted.

Inter-IES Communication (Patent 2): Shows the use of Data Diodes for secure, unidirectional communication between IES instances, preventing unauthorized data flows.

External Communication (Patent 3): Illustrates the Firewall mediating external network access for the IES instances, ensuring secure communication with the outside world.

Master Security Mesh (Patent 2): The MSM provides security monitoring and oversight for all IES instances on the endpoint.

ASKA Hub (Patents 4, 16): Shows the Hub's role in resource management (Patent 10 is implicitly included) and policy enforcement via the Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS).

Decentralized Ledger (Patents 13, 15): The ledger is shown as providing auditing and governance functions for both the Hub and the IES cluster.

Diagram 3:

graph LR

subgraph "ASKA Zone"

direction LR

subgraph "Patent 1: Modular IES with Full Stack Isolation & Dynamic Partitioning"

IES_Cluster["Modular IES Clusters"] -.-> |Dynamic

Partitioning| Child_IES["Child-IES

Instances"]

IES_Cluster --> |Dedicated

Resources| CPU["CPU"]

IES_Cluster --> Memory["Memory"]

IES_Cluster --> IO["I/O"]

IES_Cluster --> Network["Network"]

end

subgraph "ASKA Hub (Patents 4, 16)"

ASKA_Hub["ASKA Hub"] --> |Orchestration &

Management| IES_Cluster

ASKA_Hub --> |Security

Management| Master_Security_Mesh["Master Security

Mesh (MSM)"]

ASKA_Hub --> |Resource Mgmt| Resource_Manager["Resource Manager (Patent 10)"]

ASKA_Hub --> |DTMS| Dynamic_Trust_Management_System["Dynamic Trust

Management System (DTMS)"]

end

subgraph "Patent 2: Hardware-Enforced Communication & Security Mesh"

IES_Cluster -.- |Local

Security Mesh| Master_Security_Mesh

IES_Cluster ---->|Data Diode

Based IPC| IES_Cluster

end

subgraph "Patent 3: Adaptive Multi Channel Network & Out of Band Firewall"

IES_Cluster --> |Secure

Channels| Multi-Channel_Network["Multi-Channel Network"]

Multi-Channel_Network --> |Out-of-Band

Firewall| Firewall["Hardware Firewall"]

end

subgraph "Patent 11: Secure UI Kernel"

Secure_UI_Kernel["Secure UI Kernel"] -.- |Secure UI Interaction| IES_Cluster

end

subgraph "Patent 20: Secure Data Enclave System"

Secure_Data_Enclave["Secure Data Enclave"] -.- |Secure Data Sharing| IES_Cluster

end

subgraph "Patent 22: Secure InterZone Collaboration Framework"

Secure_Inter-Zone_Collaboration["Secure Inter-Zone

Collaboration Framework (SIZCF)"] -.- |Zone Federation &

Trust Inheritance| ASKA_Zone

Secure_Inter-Zone_Collaboration -.- |Secure

Communication| Multi-Channel_Network

end

subgraph "Decentralized Governance (Patents 13, 15)"

Decentralized_Ledger["Decentralized Ledger"] -.- |Audit &

Provenance| IES_Cluster

Decentralized_Ledger -.- |Governance &

Policy| ASKA_Hub

end

%% Connections

ASKA_Hub --- IES_Cluster

IES_Cluster --- Master_Security_Mesh

IES_Cluster --- Multi-Channel_Network

Secure_UI_Kernel --- IES_Cluster

Secure_Data_Enclave --- IES_Cluster

Secure_Inter-Zone_Collaboration --- ASKA_Zone

Decentralized_Ledger --- ASKA_Hub

Decentralized_Ledger --- IES_Cluster

end

subgraph "External Systems/Zones"

External_System_1["External System/Zone 1"]

External_System_2["External System/Zone 2"]

External_System_3["..."]

end

Secure_Inter-Zone_Collaboration -.- External_Systems/Zones

Description for Diagram 3:

This diagram illustrates the connections between the innovation from Patent 1 (Modular IES with Full-Stack Isolation & Dynamic Partitioning) and the rest of the ASKA architecture.

Key Components and Connections:

Patent 1: Modular IES

IES Cluster: Represents the core innovation with dynamic partitioning and dedicated resources.
Connections:

ASKA Hub: Orchestrates and manages IES clusters.
Master Security Mesh (MSM): Provides security oversight for IES clusters.
Resource Manager: Manages resources for IES clusters.
Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS): Manages trust for IES clusters.

ASKA Hub (Patents 4, 16)

Connections:

IES Cluster: Manages and orchestrates IES clusters.
Master Security Mesh (MSM): Receives security updates from the MSM.
Resource Manager: Utilizes resource management for IES clusters.
Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS): Leverages DTMS for trust management.

Patent 2: Hardware-Enforced Communication & Security Mesh

Connections:

IES Cluster: Enables local security mesh and data diode-based IPC.
Master Security Mesh (MSM): Integrates with the MSM for comprehensive security.

Patent 3: Adaptive Multi-Channel Network & Out-of-Band Firewall

Connections:

IES Cluster: Provides secure channels for IES clusters.
Hardware Firewall: Offers out-of-band firewall protection.

Patent 11: Secure UI Kernel

Connections:

IES Cluster: Enables secure UI interaction with IES clusters.

Patent 20: Secure Data Enclave System

Connections:

IES Cluster: Facilitates secure data sharing with IES clusters.

Patent 22: Secure Inter-Zone Collaboration Framework

Connections:

ASKA Zone: Enables zone federation and trust inheritance.
Multi-Channel Network: Utilizes secure communication channels.

Decentralized Governance (Patents 13, 15)

Connections:

IES Cluster: Provides audit and provenance for IES clusters.
ASKA Hub: Enables governance and policy management.

How it Connects the Innovation to the Rest of ASKA:

Security and Isolation: The diagram shows how Patent 1's innovation in modular IES with full-stack isolation and dynamic partitioning connects with other security-focused components (Patent 2, Master Security Mesh, ASKA Hub).
Resource Management and Orchestration: The connections between the IES cluster, Resource Manager, and ASKA Hub highlight the efficient management of resources and orchestration of IES clusters.
Secure Communication and Collaboration: The diagram illustrates how Patent 1's innovation integrates with secure communication channels (Patent 3), secure UI interaction (Patent 11), and secure data sharing (Patent 20) for comprehensive security.
Governance and Policy Management: The connections with Decentralized Governance (Patents 13, 15) and the ASKA Hub demonstrate the integration of audit, provenance, governance, and policy management.

Diagram 4:

graph TD

subgraph "ASKA Endpoint"

subgraph "Modular IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

IES_1["IES Instance 1 (e.g., Web Browser)"]

IES_2["IES Instance 2 (e.g., Email Client)"]

IES_3["IES Instance 3 (e.g., Doc Editor)"]

subgraph "IES 1 Internals (Expanded)"

CPU["Dedicated CPU"]

Memory["Dedicated Memory"]

IO["Dedicated I/O"]

NIC["Network Interface"]

subgraph "Zonal Isolation"

Zone1["Sub-Zone 1 (Mini-TRC)"]

Zone2["Sub-Zone 2 (Mini-TRC)"]

ChildIES1["Child IES 1"] --> Zone1

ChildIES2["Child IES 2"] --> Zone2

ChildIES1 -- "Capability-Augmented PCFS (P2)" --> ChildIES2

end

CPU --> ChildIES1

Memory --> ChildIES1

IO --> ChildIES1

NIC --> ChildIES1

CPU --> ChildIES2

Memory --> ChildIES2

IO --> ChildIES2

NIC --> ChildIES2

subgraph "Secure Execution Environment"

Kernel["Secure Kernel (Secure Boot)"]

OS["Secure OS"]

Kernel --> OS --> Apps["Applications"]

Kernel -.-> Microstructure["Microstructure (P14)"]

end

LSM["Local Security Mesh (P2)"] -.-> AnomalyDetection["Anomaly Detection (P7)"]

LSM -.-> Kernel

ChildIES1 --> LSM

ChildIES2 --> LSM

RM["Resource Manager (P9, P10)"] --> ChildIES1

RM --> ChildIES2

ChildIES1 -.-> DynamicPartitioning

ChildIES2 -.-> DynamicPartitioning

DynamicPartitioning["Dynamic Partitioning & Resource Borrowing (Patents 1, 9)"]

NIC --> Firewall["Firewall (P3)"]

Apps -.-> SecureUIKernel

SecureUIKernel["Secure UI Kernel (P11)"]

end

IES_1 --> IES_1_Internals

IES_2 -.-> InterIESComm

IES_3 -.-> InterIESComm

IES_1 ----> DTMS["DTMS (P4)"]

end

subgraph "Inter-IES Communication (Patent 2)"

DataDiode["Data Diode (Unidirectional)"]

CapManager["Capability Manager (Dynamic)"]

IES_1 --> DataDiode --> IES_2

IES_2 --> DataDiode --> IES_1

DTMS --> CapManager

CapManager --> IES_1

CapManager --> IES_2

CapManager --> IES_3

end

subgraph "ASKA Hub"

Hub["ASKA Hub"] -.-> IES_Cluster

Hub --> DTMS

end

IES_Cluster --> Hub

end

graph TD

subgraph "ASKA Endpoint"

subgraph "Inter#8209;IES Communication (Patent 2)"

DataDiode["Data Diode (Unidirectional)"]

CapManager["Capability Manager (Dynamic)"]

IES_1 --> DataDiode --> IES_2

IES_2 --> DataDiode --> IES_1

DTMS --> CapManager

CapManager --> IES_1

CapManager --> IES_2

CapManager --> IES_3

end

subgraph "Modular IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

IES_1["IES Instance 1 (e.g., Web Browser)"]

IES_2["IES Instance 2 (e.g., Email Client)"]

IES_3["IES Instance 3 (e.g., Doc Editor)"]

IES_2 -.-> InterIESComm

IES_3 -.-> InterIESComm

IES_1 ----> DTMS["DTMS (P4)"]

end

subgraph "ASKA Hub"

Hub["ASKA Hub"] -.-> IES_Cluster

Hub --> DTMS

end

IES_Cluster --> Hub

end

graph

subgraph "ASKA Endpoint"

subgraph "Modular IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

subgraph "IES 1 Internals (Expanded)"

CPU["Dedicated CPU"]

Memory["Dedicated Memory"]

IO["Dedicated I/O"]

NIC["Network Interface"]

subgraph "Zonal Isolation"

Zone1["Sub-Zone 1 (Mini-TRC)"]

Zone2["Sub-Zone 2 (Mini-TRC)"]

ChildIES1["Child IES 1"] --> Zone1

ChildIES2["Child IES 2"] --> Zone2

ChildIES1 -- "Capability-Augmented PCFS (P2)" --> ChildIES2

end

CPU --> ChildIES1

Memory --> ChildIES1

IO --> ChildIES1

NIC --> ChildIES1

CPU --> ChildIES2

Memory --> ChildIES2

IO --> ChildIES2

NIC --> ChildIES2

subgraph "Secure Execution Environment"

Kernel["Secure Kernel (Secure Boot)"]

OS["Secure OS"]

Kernel --> OS --> Apps["Applications"]

Kernel -.-> Microstructure["Microstructure (P14)"]

end

LSM["Local Security Mesh (P2)"] -.-> AnomalyDetection["Anomaly Detection (P7)"]

LSM -.-> Kernel

ChildIES1 --> LSM

ChildIES2 --> LSM

RM["Resource Manager (P9, P10)"] --> ChildIES1

RM --> ChildIES2

ChildIES1 -.-> DynamicPartitioning

ChildIES2 -.-> DynamicPartitioning

DynamicPartitioning["Dynamic Partitioning & Resource Borrowing (Patents 1, 9)"]

NIC --> Firewall["Firewall (P3)"]

Apps -.-> SecureUIKernel

SecureUIKernel["Secure UI Kernel (P11)"]

end

graph TD

subgraph "ASKA Endpoint"

direction LR

subgraph "Modular IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

subgraph "IES 1 Internals (Expanded)"

CPU["Dedicated CPU"]

Memory["Dedicated Memory"]

IO["Dedicated I/O"]

NIC["Network Interface"]

subgraph "Zonal Isolation"

Zone1["Sub-Zone 1 (Mini-TRC)"]

Zone2["Sub-Zone 2 (Mini-TRC)"]

ChildIES1["Child IES 1"] --> Zone1

ChildIES2["Child IES 2"] --> Zone2

ChildIES1 -- "Capability-Augmented PCFS (P2)" --> ChildIES2

end

CPU --> ChildIES1

Memory --> ChildIES1

IO --> ChildIES1

NIC --> ChildIES1

CPU --> ChildIES2

Memory --> ChildIES2

IO --> ChildIES2

NIC --> ChildIES2

RM["Resource Manager (P9, P10)"] --> ChildIES1

RM --> ChildIES2

ChildIES1 -.-> DynamicPartitioning

ChildIES2 -.-> DynamicPartitioning

DynamicPartitioning["Dynamic Partitioning & Resource Borrowing (Patents 1, 9)"]

NIC --> Firewall["Firewall (P3)"]

end

graph

subgraph "ASKA Endpoint"

subgraph "Modular IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

subgraph "IES 1 Internals (Expanded)"

subgraph "Zonal Isolation"

ChildIES1["Child IES 1"]

ChildIES2["Child IES 2"]

end

subgraph "Secure Execution Environment"

Kernel["Secure Kernel (Secure Boot)"]

OS["Secure OS"]

Kernel --> OS --> Apps["Applications"]

Kernel -.-> Microstructure["Microstructure (P14)"]

end

LSM["Local Security Mesh (P2)"] -.-> AnomalyDetection["Anomaly Detection (P7)"]

LSM -.-> Kernel

ChildIES1 --> LSM

ChildIES2 --> LSM

Apps -.-> SecureUIKernel

SecureUIKernel["Secure UI Kernel (P11)"]

end

Description for Diagram 4:

This diagram illustrates the detailed internals of a ASKA endpoint, focusing on the Modular IES Cluster as described in Patent 1 and its integration with the secure communication mechanisms of Patent 2. The diagram uses a layered approach, highlighting the hardware and software components within an IES, the secure communication channels between IES instances, and the overarching management and security provided by the ASKA Hub and the Master Security Mesh (MSM).

1. ASKA Endpoint (Example): This top-level subgraph encapsulates the components and interactions within a representative ASKA endpoint. The "direction LR" declaration sets the layout direction from left to right.

2. Modular IES Cluster (Patent 1): This subgraph represents a cluster of IES instances, the core of ASKA's isolation technology.

IES Instances: Shows three IES instances (IES 1, IES 2, IES 3) with labels indicating example applications (Web Browser, Email Client, Document Editor). This illustrates how different applications run in isolated environments.

IES 1 Internals (Expanded): This nested subgraph provides a detailed view inside a single IES instance.

Dedicated Resources: Shows the dedicated hardware components: CPU, Memory, I/O, and Network Interface (NIC), emphasizing the full-stack hardware isolation of each IES.
Zonal Isolation: This subgraph highlights the novel hierarchical zone concept within an IES. Child IES instances (Child IES 1, Child IES 2) are associated with sub-zones (Zone 1, Zone 2), each with its own mini-TRC for granular trust and policy management. The capability-augmented PCFS (Patent 2) communication between child IES instances is shown, enabling controlled data sharing within the IES.
Secure Execution Environment: This subgraph details the software stack within the IES: the Secure Kernel (with Secure Boot for trusted boot), the Secure OS, and the Applications. A dotted line to "Microstructure (P14)" indicates the integration of 3D microstructures for tamper evidence during boot and attestation.
Local Security Mesh (P2): The LSM monitors internal activity within the IES and connects to the Anomaly Detection system (Patent 7). It also interacts with the Secure Kernel for security policy enforcement. The LSM connects to both child IES instances, ensuring their security.
Resource Manager (P9, P10): Manages resource allocation within the IES and interacts with both child IES instances. The dotted line to "Dynamic Partitioning & Resource Borrowing (Patents 1, 9)" indicates these functions.
Firewall (P3): The dedicated firewall connected to the NIC provides network security for the IES.
Secure UI Kernel (P11): A dotted line indicates the connection to the Secure UI Kernel for secure user interaction.

Inter-IES Communication (P2): Dotted lines connect IES 2 and IES 3 to this subgraph, highlighting how Patent 2's secure communication mechanisms facilitate inter-IES interaction.

3. Inter-IES Communication (Patent 2): This subgraph details the secure communication mechanisms between IES instances.

Data Diode (Unidirectional): Represents hardware-enforced unidirectional communication channels, providing strong isolation for sensitive data flows.
Capability Manager (Dynamic): Manages the dynamically reconfigurable capabilities used for controlling access between IES instances. It receives input from the DTMS (Patent 4) for trust-based capability adjustments.
Connections: Arrows show unidirectional communication between IES instances via Data Diodes. The Capability Manager distributes capabilities to all IES instances.

4. ASKA Hub: Represents the central management entity.

Connections: A dotted line to the IES Cluster signifies its orchestration role. The connection to the DTMS highlights the Hub's involvement in trust management.

This detailed description clarifies the components, interactions, and data flows within a ASKA endpoint, focusing on the innovations of Patents 1 and 2. The layered structure and explicit patent references aid in understanding the system's architecture and security mechanisms. This visualization is instrumental in conveying the novel aspects and benefits of ASKA's hardware-rooted security approach.

Diagram 5:

graph LR

subgraph ASKA System

A[ASKA Hub] --> B(Dynamic Trust Management System);

A --> C(Automated Evolutionary Software Development System);

A --> D(Multi-Dimensional Audit Trail System);

style A fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style B fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style C fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style D fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

class A,B,C,D secure

end

subgraph "Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES)"

E((IES Instance)) --> F(Resource Manager);

E --> G(Security Monitor);

E --> H[Child IES 1];

E --> I[Child IES 2];

F --> B;

G --> B;

H --> B;

I --> B;

H -.-> I;

I -.-> H;

style E fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style F fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style G fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style H fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style I fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

class E,F,G,H,I ies

subgraph Child IES Communication

H --> J[Capability-Enhanced PCFS];

I --> J;

style J fill:#aaf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

class J communication

end

linkStyle 0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12 stroke:#555,stroke-width:1px

classDef secure fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

classDef ies fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

classDef communication fill:#aaf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

Description for Diagram 5:

This diagram details the architecture of the Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) as defined in Patent 1, showcasing its interaction with ASKA's core components and its internal workings.

1. ASKA Core Components: The top section represents the core ASKA components:

ASKA Hub (A): Orchestrates and manages all ASKA components.

Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (B): Manages trust relationships and access control policies, receiving trust information from the IES, Child IES, Resource Manager and Security Monitor modules to inform its security and policy management processes.

Automated Evolutionary Software Development System (AESDS) (C): Monitors and updates software components, including IES related components.

Multi-Dimensional Audit Trail System (MDATS) (D): Generates and manages audit trails for all ASKA activities, including those involving IES instances.

2. Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES): This section focuses on the structure and operation of a single IES instance (E) and its constituent parts.

IES Instance (E): Represents a fully isolated execution environment with dedicated hardware resources.

Resource Manager (F): Manages resource allocation and borrowing between IES instances, ensuring fairness and efficiency.

Security Monitor (G): Enforces isolation and access control between child IES instances and the parent IES instance, ensuring that each child instance operates within its allocated resource and capability parameters and that information does not leak or compromise other processes.

Child IES Instances (H, I): Represent smaller, isolated execution environments created through the dynamic partitioning of a parent IES instance. Each child IES instance inherits the hardware isolation provided by the parent IES instance.

Capability-Enhanced PCFS (J): A secure communication protocol that enables communication and capability exchange between child IES instances (H,I). The communication is strictly managed according to policies and parameters defined in the DTMS and Security Monitor.

Key Interactions:

The ASKA Hub (A) orchestrates and manages the overall system, interacting with all components.

The DTMS (B) receives trust information and security-related data from the Resource Manager, Security Monitor, and Child IES Instances, enabling dynamic adjustments of trust levels and access control policies within the system based on real-time security and usage analysis. The DTMS uses these results to provide policy updates to the Resource Manager and Security Monitor modules, ensuring that operations and policies are correctly and consistently implemented and managed.

The AESDS (C) updates software components, including the IES, Resource Manager, and Security Monitor, ensuring system health and security.

The MDATS (D) logs all events related to IES operation, providing a comprehensive audit trail.

The Resource Manager (F) dynamically allocates resources to Child IES instances based on need and policies defined in the DTMS, ensuring resource availability.

The Security Monitor (G) enforces isolation, access control, and other security policies between child IES instances based on the DTMS and mini-TRCs, reporting these to the DTMS to inform its access control and security management operations. It also ensures that no unauthorized access attempts are made, and that inter-process or inter-child IES instance communication is always managed securely based on policies and parameters established by the system.

The Child IES Instances (H, I) communicate with each other via the Capability-Enhanced PCFS (J), ensuring that all data transfers remain encrypted, authenticated, and compliant with security parameters defined in the DTMS and mini-TRCs stored on tamper-evident storage. These are further enhanced by use of the Security Monitor.

Claims:

A secure computing system comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES), each IES comprising:

(a) a hierarchy of Zones, each Zone associated with a localized Trust Root Configuration (mini-TRC) stored on a tamper-evident storage medium, said mini-TRC defining a set of trust roots, trust policies expressible in a declarative language, and inter-zone communication policies for said Zone;

(b) a plurality of child IES instances, each associated with a Zone within said hierarchy, said child IES instance comprising: (i) dedicated and physically isolated processing, memory, input/output (I/O), and networking resources, preventing cross-instance interference; (ii) a local Security Monitor enforcing resource access control and isolation; and (iii) a unique, cryptographically verifiable identifier;

(c) a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) establishing and managing trust relationships between child IES instances within and across Zones, utilizing said mini-TRCs, cryptographic identity verification, dynamic trust metrics derived from observed behavior and declared security posture, and a distributed consensus-based validation mechanism;

(d) a secure communication fabric between said child IES instances comprising dynamically reconfigurable, capability-augmented PCFS channels and hardware-enforced unidirectional communication channels, wherein said PCFS channels utilize hop fields encoding: (i) forwarding information, including source and destination child IES identifiers and path segments within the IES; (ii) dynamically issued capabilities defining permitted actions (read, write, execute), address ranges, and object types accessible within the destination child IES; and (iii) policy information expressed in a declarative language, including at least one of: rate limiting parameters, quality of service (QoS) requirements, or security check specifications;

(e) a dynamic partitioning mechanism, integrated with said DTMS, for securely creating, deleting, and modifying child IES instances, allocating resources to said instances based on real-time workload demands, security requirements, and trust policies defined in said mini-TRCs, and securely migrating workloads between child IES instances while maintaining isolation; and

(f) a distributed Resource Manager facilitating secure and efficient resource borrowing and allocation between said child IES instances based on resource availability, trust relationships, and trust policies defined in said mini-TRCs, further leveraging a bandwidth reservation system for guaranteed resource access.

Dependent Claims:

The system of claim 1, wherein said tamper-evident storage medium for said mini-TRCs is at least one of: a physically isolated secure storage element, a distributed ledger, or a combination thereof.

The system of claim 1, wherein each mini-TRC includes a digitally signed set of public keys representing trust roots, and a set of rules governing trust establishment, verification, access control, and resource allocation policies within and between child IES instances in said Zone, with support for declarative policy specification and negotiation.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DTMS verifies the authenticity and integrity of mini-TRCs using at least one of: digital signatures, cross-signatures between mini-TRCs of connected Zones, a distributed consensus mechanism, or a combination thereof, establishing a chain of trust between said Zones and enabling dynamic trust inheritance based on the zone hierarchy.

The system of claim 1, wherein said dynamic partitioning mechanism supports real-time adjustments to resource allocation and isolation boundaries of child IES instances without disrupting their operation, utilizing live migration techniques and capability updates.

The system of claim 1, wherein the physical isolation of each child IES is enforced by at least one of: hardware-based memory segmentation preventing cross-instance memory access, dedicated I/O controllers ensuring exclusive access to peripherals, physically separate network interfaces, or a combination thereof.

The system of claim 1, wherein each child IES comprises a local security mesh monitoring internal activity, communicating with a hierarchical security mesh of the parent IES, and enforcing security policies within the child IES based on trust levels determined by said DTMS and said mini-TRCs, including real-time anomaly detection based on performance, resource utilization, and communication patterns.

The system of claim 1, wherein said hop fields within said PCFS channels are cryptographically protected using at least one of: digital signatures, message authentication codes, or a combination thereof, to ensure integrity and authenticity, and are further obfuscated to prevent information leakage.

The system of claim 1, wherein said capabilities within said PCFS channels are dynamically managed by a Capability Manager, said Capability Manager adjusting capability permissions based on at least one of: trust levels of said child IES instances, real-time resource utilization metrics, system-wide security policies, error handling feedback, or a combination thereof, and wherein said capabilities have limited lifetimes and are subject to revocation.

The system of claim 1, wherein a secure communication agent mediates communication between child IES instances based on capabilities contained in hop fields of received packets and enforces access control policies by permitting or denying communication requests based on said capabilities and the trust policies defined in said mini-TRCs. Furthermore, said agent performs deep packet inspection and sanitization based on policy metadata within said hop fields.

The system of claim 1, wherein the integrity and authenticity of said hop fields are verified using at least one of: digital signatures, message authentication codes, or a 3D-printed microstructure corresponding to the hop field or a cryptographic hash thereof, or a combination thereof.

The system of claim 1, wherein said distributed Resource Manager uses at least one of: a beaconing-like process for disseminating resource availability information, a distributed resource directory storing resource availability information, a decentralized resource allocation mechanism enabling child IES instances to request and receive resources from other instances based on their respective capabilities, or a combination thereof, to facilitate secure and efficient resource allocation and borrowing.

The system of claim 12, wherein said bandwidth reservation system enables child IES instances to request and reserve bandwidth for inter-instance communication, ensuring quality of service (QoS) and preventing denial-of-service attacks, wherein bandwidth reservations are granted based on trust levels, resource availability, and policies defined in said mini-TRCs.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a secure logging and auditing mechanism that records all inter-child-IES communication events, resource access requests, and capability changes on a tamper-proof audit log, wherein said audit log is integrated with the decentralized ledger (Patent 15).

The system of claim 1, further comprising a Secure UI integration module (Patent 11) enabling secure user interaction with child IES instances and zones, wherein said module enforces access control policies based on trust levels and capabilities associated with each user and application.

Patent 2: Secure Inter-IES Communication System with Dynamically Reconfigurable Capabilities, Declarative Policies, and Adaptive Security

Abstract: This invention presents a secure communication system for multi-kernel computing environments, specifically designed for enhancing the security and flexibility of interactions between Isolated Execution Stacks (IES). The system employs a dual-channel approach, combining hardware-enforced unidirectional communication channels for high-assurance data flows with dynamically reconfigurable, capability-augmented Packet-Carried Forwarding State (PCFS) channels for flexible, policy-driven communication. PCFS channels utilize hop fields encoding forwarding information, fine-grained capabilities with limited lifetimes and revocation mechanisms, and declarative security policies, enabling precise control over access to resources and permitted actions within destination IES instances. A hierarchical security mesh, comprising local security meshes within each IES and a central Master Security Mesh (MSM), provides real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, and interrupt-based attack mitigation. A consent protocol, enhances security by requiring mutual agreement between IES instances before establishing communication. This integrated approach creates a highly secure, adaptable, and efficient communication framework for multi-kernel systems, mitigating a wide range of attacks, including timing side-channel attacks, while supporting flexible and dynamic inter-component interactions. The system further integrates with ASKA's decentralized governance framework, enabling zone-specific communication policies and distributed policy management.

Diagram 1:

graph TD

subgraph ASKA_System["ASKA System"]

subgraph IES_Cluster["IES Cluster (Patent 1)"]

IES_1["IES 1"]

IES_2["IES 2"]

IES_N["... IES N"]

subgraph IES_1_Internal["IES 1 Internal"]

App_1["Application 1"] --> Data_Diode_1["Data Diode"]

Data_Diode_1 --> Secure_Comm_Bus_1["Secure Comm Bus"]

Local_MSM_1["Local MSM"] --> Data_Diode_1

Local_MSM_1 --> Secure_Comm_Bus_1

end

IES_1 --> IES_1_Internal

subgraph IES_2_Internal["IES 2 Internal"]

Secure_Comm_Bus_2["Secure Comm Bus"] --> App_2["Application 2"]

Data_Diode_2["Data Diode"] --> App_2

Local_MSM_2["Local MSM"] --> Data_Diode_2

Local_MSM_2 --> Secure_Comm_Bus_2

end

IES_2 --> IES_2_Internal

Data_Diode_1 --> IES_2_Internal

IES_1_Internal --> Data_Diode_2

Local_MSM_1 --> MSM["Master Security Mesh (MSM)"]

Local_MSM_2 --> MSM

Local_MSM_N["Local MSM"] --> MSM

DTMS["DTMS (Patent 4)"] --> MSM

MSM -->|Security Policies| DTMS

end

subgraph External_Systems["External Systems"]

Legacy_System["Legacy System"]

External_Network["External Network (Patent 5)"]

Firewall["Firewall (Patent 3)"] --> Legacy_System

Firewall --> External_Network

IES_Cluster ----> Firewall

end

subgraph Secure_UI["Secure UI (Patent 11)"]

UI_Kernel["UI Kernel"]

IES_1 --> UI_Kernel

IES_2 --> UI_Kernel

end

style MSM fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Description of Diagram 1:

This diagram illustrates Patent 2, focusing on Hardware-Enforced Unidirectional Communication and the Security Mesh within the ASKA System. It provides a detailed view of how data diodes and the hierarchical MSM ensure secure data flow and system integrity.

ASKA System: This top-level subgraph encapsulates the components involved in secure communication and monitoring.

IES Cluster (Patent 1): Shows multiple IES instances, with two expanded to reveal their internal communication structures.

IES 1 & IES 2 & ... IES N: Represent isolated execution environments.
IES 1 Internal & IES 2 Internal: Show the internal components involved in secure communication:

Application 1 & Application 2: Illustrate applications sending and receiving data.
Data Diodes: Enforce unidirectional data flow between IES instances and other components. Multiple diodes are shown to represent different communication paths.
Secure Comm Bus: Represents the internal communication bus within each IES, protected by data diodes.
Local MSM: Monitors activity within each IES and reports to the Master Security Mesh. It also controls context-sensitive activation of data diodes based on security conditions.

Master Security Mesh (MSM): The central component of the security mesh, receiving telemetry from Local MSMs, enforcing security policies distributed by the DTMS, and coordinating system-wide security responses.

External Systems: This subgraph illustrates how the IES cluster interacts with external systems through a firewall (Patent 3), incorporating unidirectional communication where necessary.

Secure UI (Patent 11): Illustrates the unidirectional communication from IES instances to the UI Kernel to prevent UI manipulation affecting the IES.

DTMS (Patent 4): The DTMS provides security policies to the MSM, influencing its monitoring and enforcement actions.

Key Features and Interactions:

Hardware-Enforced Unidirectional Communication: The diagram clearly shows how data diodes enforce unidirectional data flow between IES instances, preventing unauthorized reverse communication or data leakage. Both allowed and blocked communication paths are visualized.
Hierarchical Security Mesh: The diagram illustrates the hierarchical structure of the security mesh, with Local MSMs monitoring individual IES instances and reporting to the central MSM.
Context-Sensitive Activation: The Local MSM's control over data diodes allows for context-sensitive activation based on security conditions and policies.
Integration with ASKA: The diagram shows how Patent 2 integrates with Patents 1, 3, 4, and 11, emphasizing its role within the broader ASKA architecture.

Diagram 2:

graph TD

subgraph "ASKA System"

subgraph "Inter-IES Communication (Patent 2)"

IES1["IES 1"]

IES2["IES 2"]

IESn["... IES N"]

IES1 -.- IECommunication

IES2 -.- IECommunication

IESn -.- IECommunication

subgraph "Secure Communication Channels (Patent 2)"

DataDiode["Data Diode (Unidirectional)"]

CapManager["Capability Manager (Dynamic)"]

IES1 --> DataDiode --> IES2

IES2 --> DataDiode --> IES1

DTMS["DTMS (P4)"] --> CapManager

CapManager -->|"Capabilities"| IES1

CapManager -->|"Capabilities"| IES2

end

subgraph "Hierarchical Security Mesh (Patent 2)"

Local_MSM1["Local MSM (IES 1)"] --> MSM

Local_MSM2["Local MSM (IES 2)"] --> MSM

Local_MSMn["...Local MSM (IES N)"] --> MSM

MSM["Master Security Mesh (MSM)"]

IES1 --> Local_MSM1

IES2 --> Local_MSM2

IESn --> Local_MSMn

end

subgraph "IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

IES_Cluster["Modular IES Cluster"]

IES1 --> IES_Cluster

IES2 --> IES_Cluster

IESn --> IES_Cluster

subgraph "IES 1 Internal"

CPU1["Dedicated CPU"]

Memory1["Dedicated Memory"]

IO1["Dedicated I/O"]

NIC1["Network Interface"]

IES_Internal_Security["Internal Security Mechanisms (P1)"]

CPU1 --> IES_Internal_Security

Memory1 --> IES_Internal_Security

IO1 --> IES_Internal_Security

NIC1 --> IES_Internal_Security

end

IES1 --> Hardware_Isolation["Hardware Isolation"] --> IES_1_Internal

end

subgraph "ASKA Hub"

Hub["ASKA Hub"] --> DTMS

Hub -.-> Orchestrator["Orchestrator (P1)"]

end

IECommunication ----> Hub

MSM ----> Hub

end

style MSM fill:#ccf,stroke:#888

style IECommunication fill:#aaf,stroke:#666

Description for Diagram 2:

Diagram Rationale and Explanation (Patent 2-centric view relative to Patent 1):

Central Focus: Secure Communication (Patent 2): Inter-IES Communication remains the diagram's central focus, showcasing the data diodes, Capability Manager, and Hierarchical Security Mesh (all key aspects of Patent 2).
IES Cluster Context: The IES Cluster (Patent 1) is now a supporting subgraph, providing context for Patent 2's operation. The relationship is clarified by showing how the secure communication channels connect to and protect the IES instances. One IES is expanded to highlight the hardware isolation and internal security mechanisms provided by Patent 1. This nested structure visually depicts how Patent 2 builds upon Patent 1's foundation.
Simplified IES Internals: The internals of the expanded IES are simplified, showing only the dedicated resources and a generalized "Internal Security Mechanisms" block. This avoids unnecessary detail while still conveying the core concepts of Patent 1.
Explicit Local MSMs: The Local MSMs within each IES are explicitly shown, connecting to the central MSM. This further emphasizes the hierarchical security mesh aspect of Patent 2.
Streamlined Hub Connection: The Hub's connection to the Inter-IES Communication subgraph underscores its role in managing the communication security aspects facilitated by Patent 2.

Diagram 3:

graph TD

subgraph "ASKA System"

subgraph "IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

IES1["IES 1"]

IES2["IES 2"]

IESn["... IES N"]

IES1 -.- InterIESComm

IES2 -.- InterIESComm

IESn -.- InterIESComm

end

subgraph "Inter-IES Communication (Patent 2)"

DataDiode["Data Diode (Unidirectional)"]

PCFS["PCFS Channel (Hop Fields & Capabilities)"]

CapManager["Capability Manager (Dynamic)"]

IES1 --> DataDiode --> IES2

IES1 --> PCFS --> IES2

DTMS["DTMS (Patent 4)"] --> CapManager

PolicyEngine["Policy Engine"] --> CapManager

CapManager --> PCFS

MSM["Master Security Mesh (MSM)"] --> PCFS

end

subgraph "ASKA Hub"

Hub["ASKA Hub"] --> DTMS

Hub --> PolicyEngine

Hub --> Orchestrator["Orchestrator (Patent 1)"]

end

InterIESComm --> Hub

MSM --> Hub

subgraph "External Systems (Patents 3, 5)"

Firewall["Firewall (Patent 3)"]

QRGateway["Quantum-Resistant Gateway (Patent 5)"]

External["External Systems"]

Firewall --> External

QRGateway --> External

InterIESComm ----> Firewall

InterIESComm ----> QRGateway

end

style InterIESComm fill:#aaf,stroke:#666

style PCFS fill:#ccf,stroke:#888

style CapManager fill:#ccf,stroke:#888

Description for Diagram 3:

This diagram focuses specifically on Patent 2 (Secure Inter-IES Communication System), highlighting its core components and integration within the ASKA system.

IES Cluster (Patent 1): Represents multiple IES instances, the foundation upon which Patent 2 builds. Dotted lines connect the IES instances to the "Inter-IES Communication" subgraph, showing that this is where inter-IES interactions occur.

Inter-IES Communication (Patent 2): This subgraph contains the key elements of Patent 2:

Data Diode (Unidirectional): Represents the hardware-enforced unidirectional communication channels for high-security data flows. Arrows show the directionality.
PCFS Channel (Hop Fields & Capabilities): Represents the capability-enhanced PCFS channels, the core innovation of Patent 2. The label clarifies the use of hop fields and capabilities.
Capability Manager (Dynamic): Manages the capabilities, dynamically adjusting them based on various factors. Arrows show its input from the DTMS and Policy Engine, and its output to the PCFS channel.

ASKA Hub: Includes the DTMS, Policy Engine, and Orchestrator. The DTMS and Policy Engine provide input to the Capability Manager. The Orchestrator from Patent 1 is included to show the integration with IES management.

Master Security Mesh (MSM): Provides security monitoring and threat intelligence. Its connection to the PCFS channel emphasizes its role in secure communication.

External Systems (Patents 3, 5): This subgraph represents external systems and includes the Firewall (Patent 3) and Quantum-Resistant Gateway (Patent 5). Dotted lines from the Inter-IES Communication subgraph connect to these components, showing how Patent 2's communication mechanisms interface with external communication.

Key Features:

Capability-Enhanced PCFS: The PCFS channel and Capability Manager are prominently displayed, emphasizing the dynamic and flexible nature of the secure communication mechanism.
Integration with ASKA: The connections to the DTMS, Policy Engine, MSM, Firewall, and Quantum-Resistant Gateway show how Patent 2 integrates with other ASKA components.

This focused diagram effectively visualizes the core innovation of Patent 2 and its role within the ASKA system. It is more concise and easier to understand than a diagram attempting to cover all 24 patents, making it more effective for presentations and technical discussions specifically about Patent 2. It also demonstrates how Patent 2 interacts with Patent 1 and leverages various aspects of ASKA’s security infrastructure. This detailed breakdown clarifies the system's security features, the dynamic nature of the capability management, and its seamless integration within the ASKA architecture.

Diagram 4:

graph LR

subgraph ASKA System

A[ASKA Hub] --> B(Dynamic Trust Management System)

A --> C(Automated Evolutionary Software Development System)

A --> D(Multi-Dimensional Audit Trail System)

style A fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style B fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style C fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style D fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

class A,B,C,D secure

end

subgraph "Secure Inter-IES Communication (Patent 2)"

E[IES Instance 1] -.-> F(Capability Manager)

F --> E

E --> G[Secure Communication Agent]

G --> H["Local Security Mesh (MSM)"]

H --> B

I[IES Instance 2] -.-> F

F --> I

I --> K[Secure Communication Agent]

K --> L["Local Security Mesh (MSM)"]

L --> B

E --> M(Data Diode)

M --> I

G --> N[Capability-Enhanced PCFS]

K --> N

style E fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style I fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style F fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style G fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style K fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style H fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style L fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style M fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

style N fill:#aaf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

class E,I,F,G,K,H,L,M,N ies

class N communication

end

linkStyle default stroke:#555,stroke-width:1px

classDef secure fill:#ccf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

classDef ies fill:#bbf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

classDef communication fill:#aaf,stroke:#333,stroke-width:2px

Description for Diagram 4:

System for Secure and Trustworthy Computation and Communication

This diagram presents a novel ASKA system and method for achieving secure and trustworthy computation and communication across multiple isolated execution environments (IES) and zones, even in the presence of compromised components or hostile external actors. The ASKA system leverages a combination of hardware-enforced isolation, dynamic trust management, AI-driven security adaptations, and multi-dimensional auditing to provide an unprecedented level of security and resilience.

1. System Architecture:

The ASKA system comprises several interconnected modules, as illustrated in the accompanying diagram. The core components are:

ASKA Hub: A central orchestration and management unit that oversees the entire system, managing resources, policies, and inter-module communication.
Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS): A distributed system responsible for establishing, maintaining, and updating trust relationships between IES instances and zones. The DTMS uses Trust Root Configurations (TRCs), dynamic trust metrics, decentralized zone management (DZMS), policy negotiation, and distributed consensus to manage trust dynamically and adaptively. TRCs are stored on a decentralized ledger for enhanced security and auditability.
Automated Evolutionary Software Development System (AESDS): An AI-driven system responsible for the development, testing, and deployment of software for all ASKA components. The AESDS incorporates an Isomorphic Architecture Monitoring and Adaptation (IAMA) module that monitors and adapts to threats originating from integrated legacy systems. Software updates are deployed securely through authenticated channels and verified using TRCs before installation.
Multi-Dimensional Audit Trail System (MDATS): A system for comprehensive auditing, encompassing both digital logs (stored on the decentralized ledger) and physical tamper-evident 3D-printed microstructures, correlated and analyzed by an AI to detect anomalies. MDATS creates a multi-dimensional audit trail encompassing software provenance, hardware attestation, and operational events.

2. Secure Inter-IES Communication:

Secure communication between IES instances is achieved through a novel dual-channel architecture:

Data Diodes: Provide unidirectional, high-assurance communication for sensitive data transfers.
Capability-Enhanced Packet-Carried Forwarding State (CE-PCFS): A capability-based communication protocol that grants fine-grained control over data access at the packet level. Capabilities are dynamically assigned and managed by the ASKA Hub's Capability Manager, based on real-time assessments of trust, resource availability, and policy. The CE-PCFS utilizes hop fields encoding capabilities and policy information to allow for secure routing and access control, reducing reliance on central management.

The communication architecture incorporates a hierarchical security mesh (MSM) for real-time monitoring and anomaly detection within individual IES instances and across the entire system.

3. Supporting Technologies:

The ASKA system utilizes a variety of supporting technologies, including but not limited to:

Secure Boot
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)
Secure UI Kernel
Chiplet Architecture
Decentralized Ledger Technology
Secure Hyper-Virtualization System (SHVS)
Federated Learning
Secure Data Enclaves
Quantum-Resistant Communication (QKD, DKM, PQC)
Zero-Knowledge Execution Environment (ZKEE)
Secure Resource Borrowing Mechanism (SRBM)
AI-powered Resource Allocation
Hardware-Enforced Anomaly Detection
Hardware-Based Memory Protection
Hardware-Enforced Secure Encrypted Enclave for Data at Rest (HESE-DAR)
Sovereign Trust Network (STN) for secure off-site connectivity
Dynamic Trust Gateway (DTG) for secure mediation with external networks

4. Claims:

This patent application claims:

A system for secure computation and communication comprising the interconnected modules described above.
A method for dynamic trust management using TRCs, dynamic trust metrics, and decentralized consensus.
A method for secure inter-IES communication employing a dual-channel architecture with data diodes and CE-PCFS.
A method for AI-driven software development, testing, and deployment utilizing sandboxing, secure distribution, and TRC-based verification.
A multi-dimensional auditing system that combines digital and physical audit trails, leveraging AI for anomaly detection and software provenance tracking.
The ASKA Hub’s orchestration and management of the interconnected modules and their dynamic interactions.
The utilization of the CE-PCFS protocol for fine-grained control over data access.
The use of the DTG for securely mediating communication between the ASKA system and external networks.
The use of the STN for establishing highly secure, isolated communication channels with off-site systems.
The use of the HESE-DAR for secure storage of data at rest and key management.

Claims:

Independent Claim 1:

A secure communication system for a computing environment comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES), each IES having dedicated processing, memory, and communication resources, and organized into a hierarchy of Zones, each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC), the system comprising:

(a) secure communication channels between said IES instances, including:

(i) hardware-enforced unidirectional communication channels ensuring data flows in a single, predetermined direction, said channels implemented using at least one of: miniaturized data diodes, dedicated unidirectional network interfaces, or dedicated hardware logic circuits; and

(ii) dynamically reconfigurable, capability-augmented PCFS channels, wherein each PCFS channel utilizes a sequence of hop fields, each hop field encoding:

(1) forwarding information, including source and destination IES instance identifiers, path segments through the multi-channel network (Patent 3), and intermediate relay points;

(2) a dynamically issued capability granting specific access rights (read, write, execute) to designated memory regions or functionalities within the destination IES instance, said capability further specifying permitted address ranges, object types, and a limited lifetime, subject to revocation by a Capability Manager; and

(3) fine-grained policy information, including at least one of: rate limiting parameters, quality of service (QoS) requirements, security check specifications, data sensitivity labels, or communication context metadata, expressed using a declarative language;

(b) a hierarchical Security Mesh, comprising:

(i) a local security mesh within each IES instance, monitoring internal communication events and resource access attempts; and

(ii) a Master Security Mesh (MSM) overseeing the system, receiving security telemetry from said local security meshes, enforcing system-wide security policies, and coordinating security responses, wherein said Security Mesh is integrated with a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (Patent 4) to manage trust relationships and enforce trust-based access control policies between IES instances;

(c) a consent protocol, wherein establishing a PCFS communication channel between two IES instances requires mutual agreement, said agreement based on at least one of: communication type, data sensitivity level, trust levels of participating IES instances, compliance with predefined communication policies, or resource availability; and

(d) a decentralized policy management system, wherein each Zone can define its own inter-IES communication policies, said policies expressed in a declarative language and stored on a distributed ledger (Patent 15), and wherein a distributed consensus mechanism is used to resolve policy conflicts between Zones.

Dependent Claims:

The system of claim 1, wherein said dynamically issued capabilities are cryptographically protected using at least one of: digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), or keyed-hash message authentication codes (HMACs), or a combination thereof, ensuring integrity and authenticity.

The system of claim 1, wherein said capabilities have limited lifetimes and are subject to revocation by a Capability Manager residing within the ASKA Hub, said revocation implemented using a secure revocation mechanism, including at least one of: certificate revocation lists (CRLs), online certificate status protocol (OCSP), or a distributed ledger-based revocation registry.

The system of claim 1, wherein said Capability Manager dynamically adjusts capability permissions in real time based on at least one of: trust levels of said IES instances, real-time resource utilization metrics, system-wide security policies defined by a decentralized governance system (Patent 13), error handling feedback received from said IES instances, or a combination thereof.

The system of claim 1, further comprising dedicated hardware within a central management entity for assisting in managing said capabilities, said hardware performing at least one of: capability storage, lookup, validation, secure distribution of said capabilities to said IES instances, or a combination thereof.

The system of claim 5, wherein said dedicated hardware is implemented as at least one hot-swappable chiplet integrated into the ASKA Hub.

The system of claim 1, wherein the integrity and authenticity of hop field data are verified using at least one of: digital signatures, message authentication codes (MACs), or a 3D-printed microstructure (Patent 14) corresponding to the hop field data or a cryptographic hash thereof, or a combination thereof.

The system of claim 1, wherein said consent protocol utilizes cryptographically signed consent tokens exchanged between IES instances, said tokens representing mutual agreement based on the specified criteria.

The system of claim 1, wherein said hierarchical security mesh monitors the timing of inter-IES communication events and detects timing anomalies indicative of potential side-channel attacks, wherein said detection triggers a security response, including at least one of: adjusting capability permissions, modifying routing policies within the multi-channel network (Patent 3), or isolating the affected IES instance.

The system of claim 1, wherein said hierarchical security mesh utilizes AI-powered anomaly detection techniques to identify suspicious communication patterns and deviations from established baselines, triggering security responses and dynamically updating security policies within the system.

The system of claim 1, wherein said multi-kernel computing system comprises a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) (Patent 1), and wherein said components correspond to said IES instances.

The system of claim 1, wherein said PCFS data plane utilizes a message authentication scheme based on message authentication code to enforce data integrity and authenticity at the granularity of each hop.

Patent 3: Adaptive Multi-Channel Network with Declarative Policy Enforcement and Capability-Aware Forwarding

Abstract: This invention discloses a secure and adaptive multi-channel network architecture for physically isolated execution environments, specifically designed for systems utilizing Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES). The architecture features dynamically configurable, physically segregated network channels, each dedicated to a specific security domain, communication purpose, or trust level, preventing cross-channel interference and data leakage. A novel aspect of this invention is the use of declarative policies to define channel configurations, firewall rules, routing policies, and access control mechanisms. These policies, expressed in a high-level language and stored on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger, enable automated and auditable network management. The architecture incorporates an out-of-band hardware firewall system, operating independently of the primary operating system and IES instances, providing dedicated firewall instances for each network channel with hardware-accelerated policy enforcement. Furthermore, a capability-aware forwarding mechanism leverages capabilities embedded within hop fields of inter-IES communication packets (Patent 2), enabling fine-grained access control and dynamic traffic management based on trust levels, resource availability, and real-time security assessments. The inclusion of dedicated, isolated channels for legacy internet access ensures backward compatibility without compromising the security of the core network. This integrated approach creates a highly secure, adaptable, and efficient multi-channel network, enabling granular control, dynamic adaptation, and automated management while supporting diverse security requirements and legacy system integration.

Diagram:

graph LR

subgraph ASKA_System["ASKA System"]

direction LR

subgraph IES_Cluster["IES Cluster (Patent 1)"]

IES_1["IES 1"]

IES_2["IES 2"]

IES_N["... IES N"]

IES_1 --> NIC_1["Network Interface Card (NIC)"]

IES_2 --> NIC_2["Network Interface Card (NIC)"]

IES_N --> NIC_N["Network Interface Card (NIC)"]

end

subgraph Multi_Channel_Network["Multi Channel Network (Patent 3)"]

Channel_1["Secure Channel 1 (e.g., High Trust)"]

Channel_2["Secure Channel 2 (e.g., Medium Trust)"]

Channel_3["Secure Channel 3 (e.g., Legacy/External)"]

NIC_1 --> Channel_1

NIC_1 --> Channel_2

NIC_2 --> Channel_1

NIC_2 --> Channel_2

NIC_N --> Channel_3

Channel_1 --> Firewall["Out-of-Band Firewall"]

Channel_2 --> Firewall

Channel_3 --> Firewall

Firewall --> External_Entities

Firewall --> Legacy_Systems

end

subgraph External_Connections["External Connections"]

External_Entities["External Entities (Patent 5, 22)"]

Legacy_Systems["Legacy Systems"]

end

subgraph ASKA_Hub["ASKA Hub"]

RM["Resource Manager (Patent 10)"]

DTMS["DTMS (Patent 4)"]

MSM["MSM (Patent 2)"]

DTMS --> Firewall

MSM --> Firewall

Firewall -->|Dynamic Firewall Rules| DTMS

Firewall -->|Threat Intelligence| MSM

end

style Firewall fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Description of Diagram:

This diagram illustrates Patent 3, the Adaptive Multi-Channel Network with an Out-of-Band Firewall, within the ASKA System. It demonstrates how physically segregated channels and the independent firewall enhance security.

ASKA System: This top-level subgraph contains all the components of the multi-channel network and its related elements.

IES Cluster (Patent 1): Shows multiple IES instances, each with a dedicated Network Interface Card (NIC).

Multi-Channel Network (Patent 3): This subgraph represents the core of Patent 3.

Secure Channel 1, 2, 3: Physically separate network channels, each dedicated to a specific security domain or purpose (e.g., high trust, medium trust, legacy/external).
Network Interface Cards (NICs): Each IES instance connects to one or more secure channels via its NIC. The diagram illustrates how different IES instances can be connected to different channels or multiple channels based on their trust levels and communication needs.
Out-of-Band Firewall: A hardware firewall operating independently of the IES instances and the main OS, providing separate firewall instances for each channel.
External Entities (Patents 5, 22): Represent external systems or zones that ASKA communicates with, potentially using quantum-resistant communication (Patent 5) and the SIZCF (Patent 22).
Legacy Systems: Represent older systems that require connection via a dedicated legacy channel.

ASKA Hub:

Resource Manager (Patent 10): Can dynamically adjust network channel allocation based on resource needs and security policies.
DTMS (Patent 4): Provides dynamic firewall rules based on the trust level of communicating entities and zones.
MSM (Patent 2): Provides real-time threat intelligence to the firewall for adaptive security responses.

Key Features and Interactions:

Physically Segregated Channels: The diagram clearly shows the physical separation of network channels, preventing cross-channel interference and data leakage.
Out-of-Band Firewall: The independent operation of the firewall is emphasized, enhancing security even if an IES instance is compromised.
Adaptive Routing and Segmentation (Implicit): While not explicitly shown, the diagram's structure supports the concept of adaptive routing and segmentation within each channel based on security policies and real-time threat assessments.
Legacy System Compatibility: The dedicated legacy channel ensures backward compatibility without compromising the security of other channels.
Integration with ASKA: The diagram highlights the integration with Patents 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, and 22, illustrating Patent 3's importance within the overall ASKA architecture. The connections from the DTMS and MSM to the Firewall emphasize the dynamic and adaptive nature of the network security.

This diagram effectively visualizes the key innovations of Patent 3 and clarifies how it enables secure and flexible network communication within ASKA. It emphasizes the physical isolation of channels, the independent firewall, and the integration with other security components.

Diagram 2:

graph LR

subgraph "ASKA System"

direction LR

subgraph "IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

IES1["IES 1"]

IES2["IES 2"]

IESn["... IES N"]

IES1 --> NIC1["NIC 1"]

IES2 --> NIC2["NIC 2"]

IESn --> NICn["NIC n"]

end

subgraph "Multi-Channel Network (Patent 3)"

Channel1["Secure Channel 1 (e.g., High Trust)"]

Channel2["Secure Channel 2 (e.g., Medium Trust)"]

Channel3["Secure Channel 3 (e.g., Legacy/External)"]

NIC1 --> Channel1

NIC1 --> Channel2

NIC2 --> Channel1

NIC2 --> Channel2

NICn --> Channel3

Channel1 --> Firewall["Out-of-Band Firewall"]

Channel2 --> Firewall

Channel3 --> Firewall

Firewall --> ChannelManager["Channel Manager (Dynamic)"]

end

subgraph "ASKA Hub"

Hub["ASKA Hub"] --> DTMS["DTMS (Patent 4)"]

Hub --> MSM["MSM (Patent 2)"]

DTMS --> ChannelManager

MSM --> ChannelManager

end

subgraph "External Systems"

External["External Systems/Zones"]

Legacy["Legacy Systems"]

Channel1 -.- External

Channel2 -.- External

Channel3 --> Legacy

end

style Firewall fill:#ccf,stroke:#888

style ChannelManager fill:#ccf,stroke:#888

Description for Diagram 2:

This diagram focuses on Patent 3, showcasing the Adaptive Multi-Channel Network and its integration with other ASKA components.

IES Cluster (Patent 1): Shows several IES instances, each with its own Network Interface Card (NIC). This emphasizes that each IES can communicate through the multi-channel network.

Multi-Channel Network (Patent 3): This subgraph contains the core elements of the patent:

Secure Channel 1, 2, 3: Represents physically separate network channels with different trust levels or purposes. Example labels (High Trust, Medium Trust, Legacy/External) clarify this.
Out-of-Band Firewall: The firewall is positioned outside the channels but connected to each, emphasizing its out-of-band nature and its role in protecting all channels.
Channel Manager (Dynamic): Manages the network channels dynamically, based on input from the DTMS and MSM. Its central position highlights its control over the network configuration.

ASKA Hub: Includes the DTMS (Patent 4) and MSM (Patent 2), which provide input to the Channel Manager.

External Systems/Zones and Legacy Systems: Represent external entities and legacy systems that ASKA communicates with. Channel 3 is specifically connected to Legacy Systems, showing the dedicated channel for backward compatibility. Channels 1 and 2 connect to External Systems/Zones via dotted lines to represent the potential for dynamic routing and connection management.

Interconnections: Solid lines show direct connections, while dotted lines represent potential or dynamically managed connections. Arrows indicate the direction of data flow.

Color Coding: The light blue highlights the core Patent 3 components (Firewall, Channel Manager).

Key Features and Enhancements:

Patent 3 Focus: This diagram clearly emphasizes the Multi-Channel Network and its key features.

Out-of-Band Firewall: The diagram visually separates the firewall from the channels to reinforce its out-of-band nature, a crucial security feature.

Dynamic Channel Management: The Channel Manager's connections to the DTMS and MSM show how security and trust information influence channel configuration.

ASKA Integration: The diagram illustrates how Patent 3 integrates with Patents 1, 2, and 4.

This diagram provides a concise and informative visualization of the key innovations of Patent 3. It highlights the adaptive, secure, and multi-layered nature of the network, making it easier for a technical audience to understand the patent's value proposition. The focused approach allows for a more in-depth illustration of the network architecture and its integration within ASKA, compared to a diagram that attempts to cover all patents simultaneously. This clarity is particularly helpful for investors, partners, and technical discussions focused specifically on the adaptive multi-channel network technology.

DIagram 3:

graph LR

subgraph "ASKA System"

direction LR

subgraph "IES Cluster (Patent 1)"

IES_1["IES 1"]

IES_2["IES 2"]

IES_N["... IES N"]

IES_1 --> NIC_1["Network Interface Card (NIC)"]

IES_2 --> NIC_2["Network Interface Card (NIC)"]

IES_N --> NIC_N["Network Interface Card (NIC)"]

subgraph "NIC 1 Details"

NIC_1 --> CEPM["Capability-Enhanced Packet-Carried Forwarding State (Patent 26)"]

CEPM --> HF["Hop Field Generation"]

CEPM --> PCAP["Packet Capabilities"]

end

NIC_1 --> NIC_1_Details

NIC_2 --> NIC_2_Details["NIC 2 Details"]

end

subgraph "Multi-Channel Network (Patent 3)"

subgraph "Firewall (Dynamically Configurable)"

FW["Firewall (Hardware-Accelerated)"]

Channel_1 --> FW

Channel_2 --> FW

Channel_3 --> FW

subgraph "Firewall Internals"

FW_Instances["Firewall Instances (per Channel)"]

Firewall_Rules["Firewall Rules (Declarative, TRC-based)"] --> FW_Instances

FW_Instances --> Packet_Filter["Packet Filter"]

Packet_Filter --> Forwarding_Engine["Forwarding Engine"]

Forwarding_Engine --> Channel_1_Out & Channel_2_Out & Channel_3_Out

end

FW --> Firewall_Internals

end

Channel_1["Secure Channel 1 (e.g., High Trust)"]

Channel_2["Secure Channel 2 (e.g., Medium Trust)"]

Channel_3["Secure Channel 3 (e.g., Legacy/External)"]

NIC_1 --> Channel_1

NIC_1 --> Channel_2

NIC_2 --> Channel_1

NIC_2 --> Channel_2

NIC_N --> Channel_3

Channel_1 --> Channel_1_Out["To External/Legacy"]

Channel_2 --> Channel_2_Out["To External/Legacy"]

Channel_3 --> Channel_3_Out["To Legacy"]

subgraph "Channel Manager (Dynamic)"

Channel_Manager["Channel Manager"] --> Channel_1 & Channel_2 & Channel_3 & FW

DTMS["DTMS (Patent 4)"] --> Channel_Manager

MSM["MSM (Patent 2)"] --> Channel_Manager

AESDS["AESDS (Patent 16)"] -.-> Channel_Manager

Channel_Manager -->|"Channel Configuration"| DLT["Decentralized Ledger (Patents 13, 15)"]

end

subgraph External_Connections["External Connections"]

External_Entities["External Entities (Patent 5, 22)"]

Legacy_Systems["Legacy Systems"]

Channel_1_Out --> External_Entities

Channel_2_Out --> External_Entities

Channel_3_Out --> Legacy_Systems

end

subgraph ASKA_Hub["ASKA Hub"]

RM["Resource Manager (Patent 10)"]

DTMS --> RM

MSM --> RM

AESDS -.-> RM

RM --> Channel_Manager

end

IES_Cluster ----> Multi_Channel_Network

Multi_Channel_Network ----> External_Connections

ASKA_Hub ----> Multi_Channel_Network

end

style Channel_Manager fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

style FW fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Diagram 3 Description:

ASKA System: This top-level subgraph encapsulates all components related to the Multi-Channel Network.

IES Cluster (Patent 1): Shows how IES instances connect to the network. Includes details of how the NIC generates hop fields and capabilities based on Patent 26.

Multi-Channel Network (Patent 3): This subgraph represents the core of Patent 3.

Secure Channel 1, 2, 3: Physically segregated network channels with different trust levels (e.g., High, Medium, Legacy/External).
Firewall (Dynamically Configurable): The out-of-band firewall, with a nested subgraph showing its internal structure. It emphasizes that firewall rules are declarative and TRC-based, connecting to Patents 13 and 15. It shows dedicated Firewall Instances per channel and how they filter traffic using the Packet Filter and route it via the Forwarding Engine to different destinations.
Channel Manager (Dynamic): Dynamically manages network channels, firewall rules, and routing policies. Receives input from DTMS (trust policies), MSM (threat intelligence), and AESDS (software/policy updates). It stores channel configurations on the Decentralized Ledger.

External Connections: Illustrates how Secure Channels connect to external entities and legacy systems, referencing Patents 5 and 22 for secure external communication.

ASKA Hub: Shows the components within the hub that interact with the Multi-Channel Network. Includes the Resource Manager (Patent 10), which receives input from the DTMS, MSM, and AESDS for dynamic resource allocation to network channels.

Key Improvements and Connections:

Detailed Firewall: Shows the internal components and data flow within the firewall, emphasizing its role in enforcing declarative, TRC-based rules and its dedicated instances for each channel.
NIC Details (P26 Integration): Explicitly includes the Capability-Enhanced Packet-Carried Forwarding State (CE-PCFS) from Patent 26 within the NIC, showing how hop fields and packet capabilities are generated.
Channel Manager Enhancements: Shows the Channel Manager's interaction with the Decentralized Ledger for storing channel configurations and its connections to the Resource Manager for dynamic resource allocation.
Clear External Connections: Explicitly shows the connections to external entities and legacy systems, referencing relevant patents.
Stronger ASKA Integration: Highlights the integration with Patents 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 15, 16, and 22.

Claims:

Independent Claim 1:

A secure multi-channel network architecture for a computing system comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) organized into a hierarchy of Zones, each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC) stored on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger, the architecture comprising:

(a) a plurality of dynamically configurable, physically segregated network channels, each channel dedicated to a specific security domain, communication purpose, or trust level, wherein each channel's configuration is determined by declarative policies expressed in a policy language and stored on said decentralized ledger;

(b) an out-of-band hardware firewall system, operating independently of the primary operating system and IES instances, and associated with each of said network channels, wherein said firewall system comprises:

(i) dedicated, reconfigurable firewall instances for each network channel, enabling granular control over network traffic filtering, security policies, and resource allocation based on said declarative policies;

(ii) hardware-accelerated policy enforcement mechanisms for efficient processing of firewall rules and access control policies; and

(iii) secure communication interfaces with each IES instance, said interfaces employing at least one of hardware-enforced unidirectional communication channels or capability-augmented PCFS channels (Patent 2);

(c) a capability-aware forwarding mechanism that utilizes dynamically generated capabilities and policy metadata embedded within the hop fields of inter-IES communication packets (Patent 2), wherein said mechanism:

(i) dynamically routes network traffic between IES instances and network channels based on capabilities, trust levels of said IES instances, workload requirements, real-time threat assessments, and policy information encoded within said hop fields; and

(ii) enforces access control policies at the data plane level based on said capabilities and policy metadata; and

(d) a Channel Manager, residing within a central management entity and integrated with a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (Patent 4), dynamically managing said network channels, firewall rules, routing policies, and channel access control based on at least one of: trust levels of said IES instances, real-time resource utilization, system-wide governance policies, TRC configurations, or error handling feedback.

Dependent Claims:

The system of claim 1, wherein said physically segregated network channels are implemented using at least one of: dedicated network interface cards (NICs) and physically separate network cabling, virtual network interfaces and logically isolated network segments within a shared physical network, or a combination thereof.

The system of claim 1, wherein said declarative policies for network channel configuration, firewall rules, and routing are expressed using a policy language that supports at least one of: rule-based policies, attribute-based policies, or role-based policies, and wherein said policies are stored on said decentralized ledger, ensuring transparency and auditability.

The system of claim 1, wherein said out-of-band hardware firewall system further comprises:

(a) an AI-powered threat detection and analysis engine for identifying and mitigating potential network attacks; and

(b) a mechanism for dynamic updates of firewall rules and policies based on real-time threat intelligence feeds, wherein said updates are authenticated and validated before application.

The system of claim 1, wherein said capability-aware forwarding mechanism prioritizes secure communication pathways based on trust levels of IES instances and dynamically isolates compromised network segments or IES instances, wherein said isolation is enforced by the firewall system based on capabilities and policy metadata.

The system of claim 1, further comprising dedicated, isolated network channels for legacy internet access, wherein said legacy channels utilize separate network interfaces and firewall instances, ensuring that legacy systems can access external networks without compromising the security of the primary network channels and IES instances.

The system of claim 1, wherein said Channel Manager dynamically adjusts bandwidth allocation for each network channel based on real-time resource utilization, workload demands, and trust levels of IES instances.

The system of claim 1, wherein the Channel Manager supports multipath routing, dynamically discovering, selecting, and managing multiple paths for inter-IES communication, wherein said path selection is based on trust levels, capability requirements, bandwidth availability, and network latency.

The system of claim 1, wherein said policy language supports formal verification techniques for ensuring correctness and consistency of declarative network policies, mitigating the risk of policy errors or vulnerabilities.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a rollback mechanism that reverts network channel configurations, firewall rules, and routing policies to a previous known good state in case of errors or security breaches.

The system of claim 10, wherein the rollback mechanism utilizes the decentralized ledger to track policy changes and their associated microstructures (Patent 14), ensuring that the rollback process itself is secure, auditable, and consistent across all ASKA deployments (Patent 17).

The system of claim 1, further comprising a dedicated logging and auditing module that records all network events, policy changes, and firewall actions on the decentralized ledger, providing a tamper-proof audit trail and facilitating investigation and compliance reporting.

The system of claim 1, wherein inter-zone communication and data exchange is governed by the Secure Inter-Zone Collaboration Framework (SIZCF - Patent 22) which implements at least one of: Differential Privacy, Homomorphic Encryption, and Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC).

Patent 4: Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) with Decentralized Zone Management and TRC-Based Trust

Abstract:

This invention introduces a Decentralized Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) for the ASKA secure computing ecosystem, providing a robust and adaptive framework for secure collaboration and resource sharing within a physically segmented, multi-kernel, zoned environment. The DTMS establishes and manages trust relationships between Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) instances within and across Zones, leveraging distributed Trust Root Configurations (TRCs) stored on a tamper-proof decentralized ledger. The DTMS utilizes cryptographic identity verification, dynamic trust metrics, a distributed consensus-based validation mechanism, and declarative trust policies for fine-grained control. A Decentralized Zone Management System (DZMS) governs zone membership, inter-zone trust, and secure TRC distribution and consistency, utilizing a beaconing mechanism for efficient dissemination of TRC updates. Furthermore, a novel policy negotiation mechanism, enables zones to dynamically establish and agree upon shared trust policies, enhancing collaboration and adaptability. This integrated approach provides a secure, transparent, and resilient trust management system for dynamic and evolving workloads, mitigating the risks associated with centralized trust authorities and promoting flexible, zone-specific security configurations.

Diagram 1:

graph TD

subgraph ASKA_System["ASKA System"]

subgraph IES_Cluster["IES Cluster (Patent 1)"]

IES_1["IES 1"]

IES_2["IES 2"]

IES_N["... IES N"]

end

subgraph DTMS["Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) Patent 4"]

TI["Trust Inference Engine"]

TPM["Trust Policy Manager"]

Trust_Level["Trust Level Database"]

PEP["Policy Enforcement Point"]

TI --> Trust_Level

TPM --> Trust_Level

Trust_Level --> PEP

subgraph Trust_Inputs

Metrics_1["IES Metrics (Patent 9/10)"] --> TI

Metrics_2["MSM Security Metrics (Patent 2)"] --> TI

Gov_AI["Governance AI (Patent 15)"] --> TI

Ext_TI["External Trust Indicators"] --> TI

end

IES_1 -.- Metrics_1 --> DTMS

IES_2 -.- Metrics_1 --> DTMS

MSM["Master Security Mesh (Patent 2)"] -.- Metrics_2 --> DTMS

subgraph Consumers["Trust Consumers"]

RA["Resource Allocator (Patent 10)"]

Firewall["Firewall (Patent 3)"]

SIZCF["SIZCF (Patent 22)"]

AESDS["AESDS (Patent 16)"]

HESE_DAR["HESE-DAR (Patent 24)"]

UI_Kernel["UI Kernel (Patent 11)"]

end

PEP -->|Access Control Decisions| Consumers

subgraph ASKA_Hub

Hub["Hub"] -->|Policy Configuration| TPM

end

style DTMS fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Description of Diagram 1:

This diagram illustrates Patent 4, the Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS), and its integration within the ASKA System. It showcases how the DTMS manages trust relationships and enforces policies, influencing various security-sensitive components.

ASKA System: This subgraph encapsulates the components related to trust management.

IES Cluster (Patent 1): Represents the IES instances whose trust levels are managed by the DTMS.

Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) - Patent 4: This subgraph details the core components of the DTMS.

Trust Inference Engine (TI): Analyzes various trust inputs to determine the trust level of each IES instance.
Trust Policy Manager (TPM): Manages trust policies and updates the Trust Level Database accordingly. It receives policy configurations from the ASKA Hub.
Trust Level Database: Stores the current trust level for each IES instance.
Policy Enforcement Point (PEP): Enforces access control decisions based on the trust levels stored in the database.
Trust Inputs Subgraph:

IES Metrics (Patents 9 & 10): Resource usage, performance, and error rates from IES instances.
MSM Security Metrics (Patent 2): Security-related events and anomalies detected by the Master Security Mesh.
Governance AI (Patent 15): Recommendations from the Governance AI based on audit trails and policy analysis.
External Trust Indicators: Trust information from external sources, such as reputation scores.

Trust Consumers: This subgraph represents the components that rely on the DTMS for trust-based access control decisions.

Resource Allocator (Patent 10): Uses trust levels for resource allocation.
Firewall (Patent 3): Applies trust-based firewall rules.
SIZCF (Patent 22): Uses trust levels for inter-zone collaboration.
AESDS (Patent 16): Uses trust levels for software updates.
HESE-DAR (Patent 24): Uses trust levels for data access control.
UI Kernel (Patent 11): Uses trust levels for displaying information and managing user interaction.

Key Features and Interactions:

Dynamic Trust Assessment: The Trust Inference Engine continuously analyzes various inputs to dynamically adjust trust levels.
Policy-Based Management: The Trust Policy Manager allows administrators to define and update trust policies, providing granular control over trust relationships.
Hardware-Enforced Isolation (Implicit): The DTMS leverages the hardware-enforced isolation of IES instances to prevent unauthorized interactions between entities with different trust levels.
Integration with ASKA: The diagram illustrates the DTMS's central role in ASKA and its interaction with various components, including the MSM, Resource Allocator, Firewall, SIZCF, AESDS, HESE-DAR, and UI Kernel. It shows how DTMS receives security configurations from the Hub, demonstrating a clear management and control process.
Zero-Trust Model (Implicit): The continuous evaluation and enforcement of trust embodies the zero-trust security model.

This detailed diagram provides a comprehensive overview of Patent 4 and its role in managing trust and enforcing security policies within the ASKA System. It effectively communicates the dynamic, adaptive, and integrated nature of the DTMS, illustrating its importance for ASKA's robust security posture.

Claims:

A secure computing system comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) (Patent 1) organized into a hierarchy of Zones (Patent 18), each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC) stored on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger (Patent 15), and a secure communication mechanism (Patent 2) between said IES instances, further comprising:

a. a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) comprising: i. a Trust Inference Engine analyzing trust evidence, including at least one of: real-time security assessments from a hierarchical security mesh (Patent 2), policy updates, operational behavior of IES instances, externally sourced trust indicators, or trust policies defined in the relevant TRCs; ii. a Trust Policy Manager managing declarative trust policies, expressed in a policy language, for controlling trust establishment and verification between IES instances; iii. a Trust Level Database storing and dynamically updating trust levels for each IES instance based on outputs from the Trust Inference Engine and Trust Policy Manager; and iv. a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) enforcing access control decisions based on trust levels, capabilities (Patent 2), and policies defined in said TRCs, integrated with a secure communication agent (Patent 2) and resource management modules (Patent 9, Patent 10); and

b. a Decentralized Zone Management System (DZMS), integrated with said DTMS and said ledger, for: i. managing Zone membership, recording changes on said decentralized ledger, and utilizing a distributed consensus protocol for consistency and availability of membership updates; ii. establishing and managing trust relationships between Zones by storing, synchronizing, and verifying the authenticity and integrity of TRCs across a distributed network of ASKA Hubs, utilizing a secure communication protocol and a distributed consensus algorithm; iii. facilitating dynamic policy negotiation between Zones, enabling Zones to propose, exchange, and agree upon shared trust policies expressed using said policy language, using a distributed consensus protocol to achieve agreement and recording negotiated policies on said decentralized ledger; and iv. securely distributing TRC updates to relevant ASKA components, utilizing a beaconing mechanism across secure communication channels (Patent 3), including at least one of: unidirectional or capability-augmented PCFS channels (Patent 2), and cryptographic verification of said TRC updates.

The system of claim 1, wherein each TRC includes:

a. a digitally signed set of public keys representing trust roots for said Zone; b. a set of rules, expressed using a declarative language, governing trust establishment and verification within said Zone; and c. policy information, expressed using a declarative language, specifying permitted interactions and data flows between IES instances within and across Zones.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DTMS verifies the authenticity and integrity of TRCs using: a. digital signatures on the TRCs; b. cross-signatures between TRCs of connected Zones, establishing a chain of trust between said Zones; and c. a distributed consensus mechanism, providing fault tolerance and resilience against malicious TRC modifications.

The system of claim 3, wherein said DTMS supports dynamic trust inheritance, where trust relationships established between lower-level Zones are automatically inherited by higher-level Zones based on the hierarchy defined in Patent 18.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DTMS dynamically adjusts trust levels of IES instances based on a combination of factors, including: real-time security assessments, policy updates, operational behavior metrics, external trust indicators, and adherence to trust policies defined in the relevant TRCs.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DTMS utilizes cryptographic techniques to verify the identity and authenticity of each IES instance before establishing a trust relationship, wherein each IES instance possesses a unique, cryptographically verifiable identifier.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DTMS employs a distributed consensus mechanism to validate trust relationships between IES instances, requiring agreement from multiple designated validators before establishing a trust relationship.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DTMS defines a hierarchy of trust levels, ranging from low-trust to high-trust, which determine the permissible interactions and resource sharing between IES instances, wherein said trust levels are dynamically adjusted based on real-time assessments of trust metrics, security policies, and TRC trust policies.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DTMS mediates resource borrowing requests (Patent 9) and capability grants (Patent 2) between IES instances based on their established trust relationship and the trust policies defined in the relevant TRCs, and wherein the Capability Manager (Patent 2) interacts with the DTMS to dynamically adjust capability permissions based on trust levels.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DTMS incorporates a zero-trust framework that continuously re-evaluates trust relationships between IES instances, utilizing real-time monitoring data and policy updates.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DZMS utilizes a beaconing mechanism to disseminate TRC updates across zones, wherein said beacons are cryptographically signed and include versioning information, enabling efficient and secure propagation of trust root configurations.

The system of claim 11, wherein said beaconing mechanism utilizes ASKA's multi-channel network (Patent 3) and incorporates capability-aware forwarding to ensure secure and efficient dissemination of TRC updates to authorized ASKA components.

The system of claim 1, wherein said policy language supports policies based on at least one of: data sensitivity labels, communication type identifiers, time-based constraints, user identity attributes, resource utilization parameters, or other contextual parameters associated with trust and access control decisions.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a Policy Conflict Resolution Engine within said DZMS that detects policy conflicts between TRCs or between IES instances, and triggers automated negotiation procedures to resolve such conflicts based on predefined rules, preference orderings, or a distributed consensus mechanism.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a secure and auditable policy change management mechanism, wherein proposed policy changes to TRCs are implemented using digitally signed update tickets, said update tickets requiring validation and approval from a quorum of authorized entities within each affected zone using a distributed consensus protocol, and wherein approved policy changes are recorded on the decentralized, tamper-proof ledger.

Patent Group II. Enhanced Security and Privacy

Patent 5: Quantum-Resistant Secure Communication with Path-Aware Key Distribution, Dynamic QKD Endpoint Discovery, and SIBRA Bandwidth Reservation

Abstract: This invention discloses a quantum-resistant secure communication system for physically isolated execution environments (e.g., Modular Isolated Execution Stacks - Patent 1), integrating path-aware key distribution, dynamic QKD endpoint discovery, and SIBRA bandwidth reservation. The system utilizes Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) to generate and distribute cryptographic keys that are provably secure against attacks from quantum computers, with a distributed key management system (DKM) ensuring resilience and preventing single points of failure. Furthermore, the DKM integrates with SCION's path servers and beaconing process, enabling secure and efficient distribution of keys only along authenticated SCION paths (Patent 2, Patent 3) and dynamic discovery of available QKD endpoints. The system incorporates post-quantum cryptographic algorithms for additional long-term security and utilizes SIBRA (Patent 11) to reserve bandwidth for QKD key exchange and other quantum-resistant communication, ensuring quality of service (QoS) and resilience against denial-of-service attacks. This comprehensive approach provides a robust, adaptable, and future-proof secure communication system for diverse computing environments.

Diagram:

graph TD

subgraph IES_A["IES Instance A"]

App_A["Application A"] --> Data["Data"]

Data --> Encryptor_A["Encryptor (PQC)"]

end

subgraph IES_B["IES Instance B"]

Decryptor_B["Decryptor (PQC)"] --> Data_B["Data"]

Data_B --> App_B["Application B"]

end

subgraph QKD_System["QKD System"]

QKD_A["QKD Module A"] --|Quantum Channel (Secure Key Exchange)| --> QKD_B["QKD Module B"]

QKD_A --> DKM["Distributed Key Manager"]

QKD_B --> DKM

end

subgraph ASKA_Network["ASKA Network (Patent 3)"]

Channel["Secure Channel"]

Encryptor_A --> Channel --> Decryptor_B

end

DKM --|Secure Key|--> Encryptor_A

DKM --|Secure Key|--> Decryptor_B

style DKM fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Description for Diagram:

This diagram illustrates the key components and interactions of the Quantum-Resistant Secure Communication system described in Patent 5.

IES Instance A & IES Instance B: These subgraphs represent two IES instances communicating securely.

Application A & Application B: Represent the applications sending and receiving data.
Data & Data_B: Represents the data being transmitted.
Encryptor_A (PQC) & Decryptor_B (PQC): Perform encryption and decryption using Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms.

QKD System: This subgraph represents the Quantum Key Distribution system.

QKD Module A & QKD Module B: These modules perform the QKD protocol over a quantum channel to establish a secure, shared key.
Distributed Key Manager (DKM): Securely stores and distributes the keys generated by the QKD system.

ASKA Network (Patent 3): Represents the Secure Channel within the ASKA Network over which encrypted data is transmitted.

Key Distribution: The DKM securely distributes keys to the Encryptor and Decryptor modules in the IES instances.

Key Features and Interactions:

Quantum Key Distribution: The QKD system is clearly shown establishing a secure key between the two IES instances. The quantum channel is labeled to emphasize its secure nature.
Distributed Key Management: The DKM plays a central role in securely storing and distributing keys, preventing single points of failure.
Post-Quantum Cryptography: The Encryptor and Decryptor modules utilize PQC, ensuring long-term security even against quantum computer attacks.
ASKA Network Integration: The secure communication takes place within the ASKA Network (Patent 3), leveraging its secure channels and other security features.
End-to-End Security: The diagram illustrates the entire process of secure communication, from data encryption at the source IES to decryption at the destination IES.

This diagram provides a clear visualization of how Patent 5 achieves quantum-resistant secure communication within ASKA. It highlights the key technologies employed (QKD, DKM, PQC) and their integration with the ASKA network architecture. This visualization clarifies the system's robust security posture and its readiness for future threats.

Claims:

A quantum-resistant secure communication system for physically isolated execution environments, comprising:

a. a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) mechanism for generating and distributing cryptographic keys;

b. a distributed Key Management System (DKM) for storing, managing, and distributing said keys, wherein said DKM integrates with a SCION-based path service (Patent 22) to distribute keys only along authenticated SCION paths;

c. a QKD Endpoint Discovery mechanism that utilizes a beaconing process (Patent 2, Patent 3) to disseminate information about available QKD endpoints, enabling dynamic discovery and selection of quantum-secure communication channels; and

d. a bandwidth reservation mechanism, integrated with SIBRA (Patent 11), that reserves bandwidth for QKD key exchange and other quantum-resistant communication.

The system of claim 1, wherein the QKD mechanism uses a hardware-based QKD module to ensure the physical security of the key generation and distribution process.

The system of claim 1, wherein the distributed key management system (DKM):

a) stores cryptographic keys in multiple physically isolated locations, utilizing at least one of: secure storage elements (Patent 24), or a decentralized ledger (Patent 15); and

b) employs a secure multi-party computation (Patent 19) protocol for managing and accessing said keys.

The system of claim 1, wherein the post-quantum cryptographic algorithms: a) are selected from a suite of NIST-approved post-quantum cryptographic algorithms; and b) provide resistance to attacks from both classical and quantum computers.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a noise injection mechanism, wherein random noise is introduced into the QKD process and communication channels to enhance security and disrupt potential eavesdropping attempts.

The system of claim 1, wherein said DKM integrates with a SCION-based path service (Patent 22) to securely distribute said keys only along authenticated SCION paths defined by hop fields within capability-augmented PCFS channels (Patent 2), utilizing a Dynamic Trust Management System (Patent 4) to manage trust levels and enforce access control policies for key distribution.

The system of claim 1, wherein said QKD Endpoint Discovery mechanism utilizes a beaconing process to disseminate information about available QKD endpoints, including at least one of: endpoint locations, supported QKD protocols, key exchange parameters, or available bandwidth for QKD operations, wherein said information is included in beacon extensions within Path Construction Beacons (Patent 2) and is authenticated using digital signatures or other cryptographic techniques.

The system of claim 1, wherein said bandwidth reservation mechanism utilizes SIBRA (Patent 11) to reserve bandwidth for at least one of: QKD key exchange, transmission of encrypted data using post-quantum cryptographic algorithms, or other quantum-resistant communication, ensuring quality of service (QoS) and resilience against denial-of-service attacks targeting quantum-secure communication channels.

Patent 6: Zero-Knowledge Execution Environment with Decentralized Verification and Zone-Based Trust

Abstract: This invention discloses a zero-knowledge execution environment (ZKEE) for secure computing, enhanced with decentralized verification and zone-based trust, designed to protect sensitive data during processing. The ZKEE leverages zero-knowledge proofs, allowing computations to be performed on encrypted data without revealing the underlying information to the executing system. A novel decentralized verification mechanism, distributes the verification process across multiple trusted entities within a ASKA Zone (Patent 18), utilizing a distributed consensus protocol to enhance trust and protect against malicious verification. Hardware-enforced data integrity mechanisms, including memory integrity checks and cryptographic verification, guarantee the integrity of data and computations throughout the execution process. Integration with ASKA's Trust Root Configurations (TRCs) and Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (Patent 4) provides a robust security framework, while support for secure input and output channels enables confidential data transfer. This combined approach provides a robust, secure, and privacy-preserving solution for computation on sensitive data in untrusted or potentially compromised environments.

Diagram:

graph TD

subgraph ZKEE["Zero Knowledge Execution Environment (Patent 6)"]

direction LR

Input["Encrypted Input Data"] --> ZK_Computation_Module["ZK Computation Module"]

ZK_Computation_Module --> Output["Encrypted Output Data"]

subgraph Hardware_Enforcement["Hardware Enforcement"]

Memory_Integrity["Memory Integrity Checks"]

Crypto_Verification["Cryptographic Verification (e.g., Hashing)"]

end

ZK_Computation_Module -.- Memory_Integrity

ZK_Computation_Module -.- Crypto_Verification

subgraph ZK_Proof_System["ZK Proof System"]

Prover["Prover"] --> Verifier["Verifier"]

end

ZK_Computation_Module -.- Prover

Verifier --> Output

end

IES["IES Instance (Patent 1)"] --> Input

Output --> IES

style ZK_Computation_Module fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Description for Diagram:

This diagram illustrates the key components and interactions within the Zero-Knowledge Execution Environment (ZKEE) as described in Patent 6.

Zero-Knowledge Execution Environment (Patent 6): This subgraph encapsulates the entire ZKEE and its internal components.

Input/Output:

Encrypted Input Data: Represents the encrypted data provided to the ZKEE for processing.
Encrypted Output Data: Represents the encrypted results of the computation.

ZK Computation Module: This is the core component of the ZKEE, responsible for performing computations on encrypted data without decrypting it.

Hardware Enforcement: This subgraph emphasizes the hardware-based security mechanisms that ensure data integrity within the ZKEE.

Memory Integrity Checks: Hardware mechanisms continuously verify the integrity of the memory used by the ZK Computation Module, preventing tampering or unauthorized access.
Cryptographic Verification (e.g., Hashing): Hardware-assisted cryptographic operations, such as hashing, are used to verify the integrity of the computations and ensure that the results are correct.

ZK Proof System: This subgraph represents the zero-knowledge proof system used to verify the correctness of the computation without revealing the underlying data.

Prover: Generates a zero-knowledge proof demonstrating the validity of the computation.
Verifier: Verifies the proof generated by the Prover, ensuring the computation's correctness.

IES Instance (Patent 1): The ZKEE operates within the isolated environment of an IES instance, adding another layer of security. The IES instance provides the encrypted input data and receives the encrypted output data.

Key Features and Interactions:

Data Privacy: The diagram highlights that the ZK Computation Module operates on encrypted data, ensuring that sensitive information is never exposed in cleartext.
Hardware-Enforced Integrity: The Hardware Enforcement subgraph emphasizes the role of hardware in protecting the integrity of the data and computations.
Zero-Knowledge Proofs: The ZK Proof System subgraph shows how zero-knowledge proofs are used to verify the correctness of the computations without revealing the underlying data.
IES Integration: The connection to the IES Instance emphasizes the secure and isolated environment in which the ZKEE operates.

This diagram visually represents the core principles of Patent 6, showcasing how the ZKEE protects data privacy and integrity during computation. It clarifies the interactions between its components and emphasizes the role of hardware enforcement and zero-knowledge proofs in achieving its security goals. It also clearly shows the ZKEE's integration within the broader ASKA architecture.

Claims:

(Independent) A zero-knowledge execution environment (ZKEE) for secure computing within a system comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) (Patent 1) organized into a hierarchy of Zones (Patent 18), each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC), comprising:

a. a zero-knowledge computation module for performing computations on encrypted data within a physically isolated execution environment; b. a decentralized verification system, wherein the verification process for zero-knowledge proofs generated by said computation module is distributed across multiple trusted entities within a Zone, utilizing a distributed consensus protocol to achieve agreement on proof validity and protect against malicious verification; and c. hardware-enforced data integrity mechanisms, including memory integrity checks and cryptographic verification using hardware-based cryptographic modules, ensuring the integrity of data and computations throughout the execution process within said isolated environment.

(Dependent) The environment of claim 1, wherein the zero-knowledge computation module utilizes zero-knowledge proofs to verify the correctness of computations without revealing the underlying data or the execution flow within said isolated environment.

(Dependent) The environment of claim 1, wherein the hardware-enforced data integrity mechanisms include at least one of: a) memory integrity checks, ensuring data within said isolated environment remains unaltered during processing; and b) cryptographic hash functions and digital signatures (Patent 24) to verify the integrity of computations performed by said computation module.

(Dependent) The environment of claim 1, further comprising secure input and output channels for transferring encrypted data into and out of the execution environment, wherein said channels utilize hardware-enforced unidirectional communication (Patent 2) and/or capability-augmented PCFS (Patent 25) to ensure confidentiality and integrity of data in transit.

(Dependent) The environment of claim 1, wherein said decentralized verification system selects said trusted entities based on trust levels determined by a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (Patent 4) and trust policies defined in the relevant TRC, and wherein said distributed consensus protocol requires agreement from a quorum of said trusted entities before accepting the validity of a zero-knowledge proof.

(Dependent) The environment of claim 1, wherein said isolated execution environment is at least one of: a Modular Isolated Execution Stack (IES) instance (Patent 1), a Secure Data Enclave (Patent 20), or other hardware-enforced isolated compartment, ensuring physical and logical separation from untrusted or potentially compromised components.

(Dependent) The environment of claim 1, wherein said ZKEE supports the execution of multiple, isolated zero-knowledge computations concurrently within said isolated environment, utilizing dynamic resource allocation (Patent 10) and hardware-enforced isolation between said computations to prevent interference.

(Dependent) The environment of claim 1, wherein the configuration and parameters of said ZKEE, including the set of trusted entities, the consensus protocol, and the cryptographic algorithms used for verification, are defined within a Zone-specific policy encoded in the associated TRC.

Key Changes and Rationale:

Decentralized Verification: Claim 1 now explicitly includes the decentralized verification system, a major innovation. This distributes the verification process across multiple trusted entities, enhancing trust and protecting against malicious verification. The use of a distributed consensus protocol and the selection of trusted entities based on DTMS trust levels and TRC policies further strengthen this feature. The claims also explicitly mention hardware enforcement and additional hardware elements to increase isolation and security during computations.
Integration with ASKA: The claims now clearly integrate the ZKEE with ASKA's architecture, referencing IES instances, Zones, TRCs, the DTMS, hardware-enforced unidirectional communication, capability-augmented PCFS, secure data enclaves, and dynamic resource allocation. This demonstrates how the ZKEE leverages ASKA's security features.
Secure Input/Output: Claim 4 strengthens the security of input and output channels by explicitly referencing ASKA's secure communication mechanisms.
Zone-Based Configuration: Claim 8 links the ZKEE's configuration to zone-specific policies, enabling granular control and customization based on the zone's security requirements.
Concurrent Computations: Claim 7 introduces support for concurrent zero-knowledge computations within the isolated environment, enhancing the ZKEE's functionality and flexibility.

Patent 7: Hardware-Enforced Anomaly Detection, Isolation, and Self-Healing with Secure SCMP Reporting, Zonal Response Policies, and Timing Side-Channel Detection

Abstract: This invention discloses a robust and adaptive anomaly detection and recovery system for secure computing environments, enhanced with secure reporting, zonal response policies, and timing side-channel detection. The system employs hardware-based anomaly detection mechanisms that continuously monitor system behavior, resource utilization, and communication patterns, including the timing of sensitive operations, to identify deviations from expected behavior and potential timing side-channel attacks. A secure reporting mechanism ensures authenticated and tamper-proof transmission of anomaly reports. Hardware-enforced isolation physically disconnects affected components upon anomaly detection, preventing the spread of threats. Automated self-healing procedures, guided by zone-specific policies and managed by a distributed recovery controller, restore system integrity while minimizing downtime. This integrated approach provides a comprehensive and resilient security solution for dynamic and potentially hostile computing environments.

Diagram:

graph LR

subgraph IES_Instance["IES Instance (Patent 1)"]

App["Application"] --> HW_Monitor["Hardware Monitor (Performance, Resources, Behavior, Network)"]

HW_Monitor --> Anomaly_Detector["Anomaly Detector (AI/ML, Patent 10)"]

Local_MSM["Local MSM (Patent 2)"] -.-> Anomaly_Detector

Anomaly_Detector -- Anomaly Detected --> Isolator["Isolator (Hardware-Enforced)"]

Isolator --> Secure_OS["Secure OS (Patent 1)"]

Isolator --> Self_Healer["Self-Healer"]

Self_Healer --> Reset["Reset Component/Chiplet (Patent 12)"]

Self_Healer --> Resource_Reallocation["Resource Reallocation (Patent 10)"]

Self_Healer --> Redeploy["Redeploy Application/Chiplet (Patent 16 - AESDS)"]

Self_Healer --> Verify["Verify System Health"]

Verify -- Healthy --> Secure_OS

Verify -- Unhealthy --> Alert["Alert & Escalate (to ASKA Hub - Patent 2,3)"]

subgraph Chiplet_System["Chiplet System (Patent 12 - Optional)"]

Chiplet["Chiplet"] --> HW_Monitor

Chiplet -.-> Isolator

Chiplet -.-> Self_Healer

end

style Anomaly_Detector fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

style Isolator fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

style Self_Healer fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Description of Diagram:

This diagram illustrates the Hardware-Enforced Anomaly Detection, Isolation, and Self-Healing system within a ASKA IES instance, now including explicit integration with other patents and a clearer depiction of the self-healing process.

IES Instance (Patent 1): This subgraph encapsulates the anomaly detection and recovery system within an isolated IES.

Monitoring and Detection:

Application: The application running within the IES.
Hardware Monitor: Monitors performance, resource usage, application behavior, and network activity. The inclusion of network monitoring strengthens the anomaly detection capabilities, aligning with the security focus of ASKA.
Anomaly Detector (AI/ML, Patent 10): Employs AI/ML algorithms (potentially leveraging Patent 10 for intelligent resource prediction) to detect anomalous behavior based on monitoring data.
Local MSM (Patent 2): Provides real-time security context and threat intelligence, aiding the Anomaly Detector in distinguishing between normal fluctuations and genuine security threats.

Isolation:

Isolator (Hardware-Enforced): Upon anomaly detection, the Isolator physically isolates the affected component. This could be the entire IES or, if applicable, a specific chiplet (Patent 12), providing granular isolation. It communicates with the Secure OS to isolate the affected entity.

Self-Healing:

Self-Healer: Orchestrates the automated recovery process.
Reset Component/Chiplet (Patent 12): Resets the affected component to a known good state.
Resource Reallocation (Patent 10): Dynamically reallocates resources (Patent 10) if the anomaly is due to resource exhaustion. This active remediation step adds robustness to the self-healing process.
Redeploy Application/Chiplet (Patent 16 - AESDS): Redeploys the application or faulty chiplet, potentially using a known good version from AESDS (Patent 16). This step reinforces the connection to ASKA's software management capabilities.
Verify System Health: Checks if the system has returned to a healthy state.

Reintegration or Escalation:

If healthy, the IES or chiplet is reintegrated by the Isolator, communicating with the Secure OS.
If unhealthy, an alert is generated and escalated to the ASKA Hub via the secure communication channels provided by Patents 2 and 3.

Chiplet System (Patent 12 - Optional): This optional subgraph illustrates how Patent 7 integrates with the chiplet architecture. A faulty chiplet can be isolated, reset, or redeployed independently, demonstrating granular self-healing capabilities.

Key Features of this Diagram:

Expanded Monitoring: Includes network monitoring as a key input for anomaly detection.
Granular Isolation: Shows the ability to isolate not only the IES but also individual chiplets.
Detailed Self-Healing: Explicitly depicts the steps involved in the self-healing process, including resource reallocation and redeployment.
Stronger ASKA Integration: Highlights connections to Patents 2, 3, 10, 12, and 16.

This diagram provides a comprehensive and informative visualization of Patent 7, emphasizing its key features, adaptive nature, and tight integration with other ASKA components. It clarifies how the system automatically responds to anomalies and takes corrective actions, enhancing the resilience and security of the overall system.

Claims:

(Independent) An anomaly detection and recovery system for a secure computing system comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) (Patent 1) organized into a hierarchy of Zones (Patent 18), each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC) stored on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger, comprising:

a. hardware-based anomaly detection mechanisms continuously monitoring system behavior, resource utilization, and communication patterns within and between said IES instances, further comprising monitoring the timing of sensitive operations to detect potential timing side-channel attacks; b. a hardware-enforced isolation mechanism for physically isolating affected components upon detection of an anomaly; c. an automated self-healing mechanism for restoring system integrity, guided by zone-specific recovery policies defined in the associated TRCs and managed by a distributed recovery controller; and d. a secure reporting mechanism for transmitting authenticated anomaly reports to designated authorities within a Zone.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said hardware-based anomaly detection mechanisms: a) monitor performance metrics, resource utilization, communication patterns, and the timing of sensitive operations, such as cryptographic operations, memory accesses, or inter-IES communication; and b) employ machine learning algorithms implemented in hardware to identify anomalies, using trust levels from a DTMS (Patent 4) and behavior baselines established for each Zone.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said hardware-enforced isolation mechanism physically disconnects affected components from communication channels and shared resources by at least one of: disabling network interfaces, modifying capability permissions (Patent 2), adjusting memory access control (Patent 8), or a combination thereof.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said automated self-healing mechanism: a) resets isolated components to a known secure state, utilizing secure boot procedures (Patent 1); b) redistributes workloads to unaffected components, employing a dynamic resource allocation mechanism (Patent 10) and considering the trust levels of available IES instances; c) verifies system health using at least one of: integrity checks, functional tests, or behavior analysis, before reintegrating isolated components; and d) escalates unresolved anomalies to a higher authority in the Zone hierarchy or a designated security management entity through authenticated communication channels (Patents 2, 3).

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said secure reporting mechanism transmits authenticated anomaly reports through secure communication channels (Patents 2, 3), including at least one of: anomaly type, severity level, affected components, timestamp of detection, diagnostic information, or timing data related to detected timing side-channel attacks, to designated authorities within a Zone and/or a central monitoring system.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said designated authorities within a Zone are selected based on trust levels determined by the DTMS (Patent 4), trust policies defined in the relevant TRC, or a combination thereof.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said zone-specific recovery policies, stored within the corresponding TRC on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger (Patent 15), define permitted self-healing actions, resource allocation constraints, and escalation procedures based on at least one of: anomaly type, severity level, or the trust level of the affected component.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said distributed recovery controller coordinates recovery actions across multiple IES instances within a Zone, utilizing a distributed consensus protocol (Patent 13) to ensure consistent system recovery. Further, said distributed recovery controller dynamically adjusts its behavior based on feedback from the anomaly detection system, trust levels of IES instances, and resource availability within the Zone.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said anomaly detection mechanisms monitor timing of sensitive operations, and generate timing-based anomaly reports if the timing of said operations deviates from established baselines or expected behavior, wherein said timing data is cryptographically protected using a message authentication code or digital signature before transmission through secure communication channels.

Patent 8: Hardware-Based Memory Protection with Capability-Based Access Control and Dynamic Obfuscation

Abstract: This invention discloses a system for enhancing memory security within secure execution environments, utilizing a multi-faceted approach combining hardware-based memory obfuscation, segmentation, verification, and capability-based access control. Memory obfuscation techniques, such as address scrambling and randomization, updated dynamically at a frequency comparable to the processor clock, protect against memory probing and reverse engineering attacks, including those exploiting timing side channels. Hardware-enforced memory segmentation isolates critical memory regions, preventing unauthorized access and data leakage. Real-time memory verification mechanisms continuously monitor memory integrity, detecting and responding to any corruption or unauthorized modifications. Furthermore, integration with a capability-based access control system provides fine-grained control over access to obfuscated memory regions, specifying permitted actions (read, write, execute) and address ranges for each capability. This combined approach, augmented with an ORAM-like design for masking memory access patterns, provides robust protection against a wide range of memory-based attacks.

Diagram:

graph LR

subgraph IES_Instance["IES Instance (Patent 1)"]

CPU["CPU"] --> MMU["Memory Management Unit (MMU)"]

MMU --> Memory["Physical Memory"]

subgraph Memory_Protection["Hardware Based Memory Protection (Patent 8)"]

Obfuscator["Memory Obfuscator"]

Segmenter["Memory Segmenter"]

Verifier["Memory Verifier"]

Obfuscator -->|Scrambled Addresses, Randomized Data| Memory

Segmenter -->|Secure Segmentation, Access Control| Memory

Verifier -->|Integrity Checks, Anomaly Detection| Memory

end

MMU -.- Obfuscator

MMU -.- Segmenter

MMU -.- Verifier

subgraph Software["Software"]

OS["Operating System"]

Application["Application"]

OS --> Application

end

Application -.-|Memory Access Requests| MMU

end

style Memory_Protection fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Description of Diagram:

This diagram illustrates the hardware-based memory protection mechanisms described in Patent 8, integrated within an IES instance.

IES Instance (Patent 1): This subgraph represents the isolated execution environment of an IES.

CPU, MMU, Memory: These components represent the standard memory access pathway.

Hardware-Based Memory Protection (Patent 8): This subgraph contains the core components of the patent.

Memory Obfuscator: Performs memory obfuscation techniques, such as address scrambling and data randomization, to protect against memory probing and reverse engineering. The diagram visually connects it to Memory to represent the result of its operation: scrambled addresses and randomized data.
Memory Segmenter: Implements hardware-enforced memory segmentation, isolating critical memory regions and enforcing access control policies at the hardware level. The visual connection to Memory highlights segmentation and controlled access.
Memory Verifier: Performs real-time memory verification, using integrity checks (e.g., checksums) and anomaly detection to detect and respond to memory corruption. The arrow to Memory emphasizes active integrity checks and anomaly detection.

MMU Integration: The MMU interacts with all three memory protection components, showing how these hardware mechanisms are integrated into the memory management process.

Software: This subgraph represents the software stack running within the IES.

Operating System & Application: These components make memory access requests through the MMU.

Key Features and Interactions:

Hardware Enforcement: The diagram emphasizes that the memory protection mechanisms are implemented in hardware, providing a strong security boundary against software-based attacks.
Layered Protection: The three components (Obfuscator, Segmenter, Verifier) provide multiple layers of protection against various memory-based attacks.
IES Integration: The integration within the IES instance ensures that memory protection is applied to each isolated execution environment.
MMU Integration: The MMU's interaction with the memory protection components shows how these mechanisms are integrated into the memory management process.
Transparent to Software: The diagram indicates that the memory protection mechanisms are transparent to the software running within the IES, simplifying application development.

This diagram clearly visualizes how Patent 8's hardware-based memory protection mechanisms operate within an IES instance. It clarifies the functions of each component and highlights their combined effect in creating a robust defense against a wide range of memory-based attacks.

Claims:

(Independent) A memory security system for secure execution environments within a computing system comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) (Patent 1), each IES having dedicated memory resources, comprising:

a. a hardware-based memory obfuscation mechanism that dynamically scrambles memory addresses and randomizes data stored in memory, wherein the obfuscation parameters are updated at a frequency comparable to the processor clock to protect against timing-based attacks; b. a hardware-enforced memory segmentation mechanism that isolates critical memory regions and enforces access control policies at the hardware level; c. a real-time memory verification mechanism that continuously monitors memory integrity and detects memory corruption or unauthorized modifications; and d. a capability-based access control mechanism, integrated with said memory obfuscation and segmentation mechanisms, for managing access to obfuscated memory regions, wherein each capability grants specific access rights (read, write, execute) and address ranges to designated memory segments.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein the hardware-based memory obfuscation mechanism employs at least one of: address scrambling, data randomization, or a combination thereof, and wherein the obfuscation parameters, including at least one of: encryption keys, randomization seeds, or lookup tables, are dynamically updated.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein the hardware-enforced memory segmentation mechanism: a) creates physically isolated memory regions for different security levels or trust domains; and b) dynamically adjusts memory segmentation based on real-time security assessments, trust levels of execution contexts, or policy updates from a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (Patent 4), ensuring adaptability and responsiveness to changing security requirements.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein the real-time memory verification mechanism: a) employs checksums, error correction codes, or other integrity checks to detect memory corruption or unauthorized modifications; and b) triggers security responses, such as isolation, self-healing (Patent 7), or escalation to a security management entity (Patent 2), upon detection of memory corruption.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said capability-based access control mechanism manages access to obfuscated memory regions using capabilities, wherein each capability specifies at least one of: a) permitted actions (read, write, execute) for the corresponding memory segment, wherein write access to memory storing capabilities themselves is restricted to prevent capability forgery; and b) address ranges accessible within said obfuscated memory region.

(Dependent) The system of claim 5, wherein said capabilities are dynamically issued and managed by a Capability Manager residing within a central management entity, and wherein capability permissions and address ranges are dynamically adjusted based on at least one of: trust levels derived from the DTMS (Patent 4), real-time resource usage, security policies defined within Trust Root Configurations (TRCs), or a combination thereof.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, further comprising an ORAM-like design for masking memory access patterns, converting memory accesses to obfuscated addresses into randomized sequences of physical memory accesses, thus preventing disclosure of access patterns to external observers and enhancing resistance against timing or cache-based side-channel attacks.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said secure execution environment corresponds to a Modular Isolated Execution Stack (IES) instance (Patent 1), and wherein said memory obfuscation, segmentation, verification, and access control mechanisms operate within each IES instance to protect its dedicated memory resources.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said system integrates with a secure boot process (Patent 1), authenticating and verifying the integrity of memory management components and obfuscation mechanisms before initializing memory operations, and establishing a secure root of trust for memory access.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, further comprising a hardware-assisted mechanism for managing and enforcing said capabilities and access control policies, enhancing the performance and security of memory access operations.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein all memory accesses are recorded on a 3D-printed microstructure audit trail (Patent 14), linked to corresponding digital records on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger (Patent 15), providing a verifiable and tamper-evident record of memory operations for enhanced security and auditability.

Patent Group III. Dynamic Resource Management and Optimization

Patent 9: Secure Resource Borrowing and Granular I/O Management with TRC-Based Policies, Multipath Communication, and Hardware-Enforced Isolation

Abstract:

This invention presents a system for secure resource borrowing and granular I/O management within a secure, zoned computing environment utilizing Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES). The system enhances resource utilization, security, and resilience by enabling IES instances to securely lend and borrow idle resources (e.g., processing power, memory, storage) while maintaining strict hardware-enforced isolation and adhering to trust policies defined in Trust Root Configurations (TRCs). A hardware-enforced Secure Resource Borrowing Mechanism (SRBM), employing a PCFS-like mechanism with hop fields for efficient communication of requests and allocations, manages resource access. Granular I/O management is achieved through a hardware-based Isolated I/O Gateway (IIG) incorporating a hardware I/O Switch Fabric and a Zero Trust I/O Handoff Protocol (ZTIOH) utilizing dynamically generated, cryptographically authenticated tokens and unique, verifiable IES identifiers for access control, strengthened with capability-based access rights. A Multipath Communication Manager (MCM) establishes and manages multiple secure communication paths for resource borrowing and I/O operations, optimizing for load balancing, bandwidth aggregation, and fault tolerance while integrating with the DTMS and capability system for enhanced security. Declarative policies, integrated with the DTMS and TRCs, provide flexible control over resource access, enhancing security and adaptability in dynamic computing environments. A Multi-Layered Virtual Console (MLVC) provides secure user interaction with multiple isolated IES environments, and contextual Input/Output Redirection Protocols route signals to the correct IES instance based on the active environment and TRC policies. A secure Resource Return Protocol verifies the state of returned resources and utilizes secure communication channels for resource release notifications.

Diagram:

graph LR

subgraph IES_A["IES Instance A (Borrower)"]

App_A["Application A"] --> LRM_A["Local Resource Manager"]

LRM_A --> SRBM["Secure Resource Borrowing Mechanism"]

end

subgraph IES_B["IES Instance B (Lender)"]

LRM_B["Local Resource Manager"] --> Resource_Pool_B["Available Resources"]

Resource_Pool_B --> SRBM

end

SRBM -- Borrowed Resources --> LRM_A

LRM_A --> App_A

subgraph Shared_Peripherals["Shared Peripherals"]

Peripheral_1["Peripheral 1"]

Peripheral_N["... Peripheral N"]

end

subgraph IIG["Isolated I/O Gateway (IIG)"]

IOSF["I/O Switch Fabric"] --> Peripheral_1

IOSF --> Peripheral_N

ZTIOH["Zero Trust I/O Handoff Protocol"] --> IOSF

LRM_A -- I/O Request --> ZTIOH

LRM_A -.-> Token_Manager["Dynamic Token Manager"] --> ZTIOH

MSM["Master Security Mesh (Patent 2)"] --> Token_Manager["Authorization Policies"]

end

LRM_A ----> IIG

style SRBM fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

style IIG fill:#aaf,stroke:#444

Description for Diagram:

This diagram illustrates the components and processes involved in Secure Resource Borrowing and Granular I/O Management as described in Patent 9.

IES Instances: The diagram shows two IES instances: IES Instance A (Borrower) and IES Instance B (Lender). This setup illustrates the resource borrowing process.

Application A: Represents the application in IES A requesting resources.
Local Resource Managers (LRM_A & LRM_B): Manage resources within their respective IES instances and interact with the SRBM and IIG.
Resource_Pool_B: Represents the available resources in IES B that can be borrowed.

Secure Resource Borrowing Mechanism (SRBM): This central component mediates resource borrowing requests, ensuring secure and controlled resource sharing between IES instances. It receives requests from the borrower (IES A) and allocates available resources from the lender (IES B).

Isolated I/O Gateway (IIG): This subgraph represents the secure I/O management system.

I/O Switch Fabric (IOSF): Provides hardware-level switching between IES instances and shared peripherals, ensuring exclusive access and preventing conflicts.
Zero Trust I/O Handoff Protocol (ZTIOH): Secures I/O access using dynamically generated, hardware-based tokens, enforcing a zero-trust approach to peripheral access.
Dynamic Token Manager: Generates and manages the tokens used by the ZTIOH. It receives authorization policies from the Master Security Mesh (MSM).
Peripheral 1 & ... Peripheral N: Represent shared peripherals accessible through the IIG.

Connections and Data Flow:

Resource Borrowing: Arrows show the flow of resource requests and allocations between the IES instances and the SRBM.
I/O Management: Arrows illustrate the path of I/O requests from LRM_A to the IIG, through the ZTIOH and IOSF, to the peripherals. The dashed line shows the involvement of the Dynamic Token Manager in the process, under the supervision of the MSM (Patent 2).

Key Features Highlighted:

Secure Isolation: The diagram emphasizes that resource borrowing occurs without compromising the isolation between IES instances.
Granular Control: The IIG and ZTIOH provide granular control over access to shared peripherals.
Zero-Trust I/O: The use of dynamically generated tokens enforces a zero-trust model for peripheral access.
Hardware Enforcement: The IOSF and token-based authentication are implemented in hardware, providing a strong security boundary.
Integration with ASKA: The diagram shows the integration with the MSM (Patent 2) for I/O authorization policies, emphasizing the cohesive security approach.

This diagram provides a detailed and comprehensive view of Patent 9's functionalities, clarifying the secure resource borrowing mechanism and granular I/O management within ASKA. It effectively communicates how the system optimizes resource utilization without compromising security and isolation.

Claims:

A system for secure resource borrowing and granular I/O management within a secure computing system comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) (Patent 1) organized into a hierarchy of Zones (Patent 18), each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC) stored on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger (Patent 15), comprising:

a. a hardware-enforced Secure Resource Borrowing Mechanism (SRBM) enabling an IES instance to securely borrow idle resources from another IES instance, utilizing a PCFS-like mechanism with hop fields carrying resource requests and allocation information, maintaining strict hardware-level isolation, and adhering to trust policies defined in said TRCs;

b. a Granular I/O Management system, comprising:

i. an Isolated I/O Gateway (IIG) with a hardware-based I/O Switch Fabric, providing secure, time-bound access to shared I/O devices for each IES instance, using unique, cryptographically verifiable identifiers to control and authenticate access; and

ii. a Zero Trust I/O Handoff Protocol (ZTIOH) that secures I/O access through dynamically generated, cryptographically authenticated tokens and capability-based access control (Patent 2), wherein said tokens are verified by the IIG using a secure, side-channel resistant comparison process; and

c. a Multipath Communication Manager (MCM) establishing and managing multiple secure communication paths between IES instances for resource borrowing and I/O operations, utilizing capabilities (Patent 2) and optimizing for at least one of: load balancing, bandwidth aggregation, or fault tolerance, wherein said MCM dynamically adjusts path selection and traffic distribution based on real-time network conditions, security assessments, and resource availability.

The system of claim 1, wherein said SRBM:

a. verifies the trust levels of both the borrowing and lending IES instances using a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (Patent 4);

b. permits resource borrowing only between IES instances with sufficient trust levels according to the policies defined in the relevant TRCs; and c. utilizes a PCFS-like mechanism for efficient communication of resource requests and allocations, wherein requests and allocations are encoded within hop fields.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a hardware-based Resource Allocation Controller that:

a. continuously monitors the availability of resources and trust levels across all IES instances, retrieving real-time resource usage information and TRC-based trust policies from the DTMS (Patent 4); and

b. facilitates secure resource borrowing based on real-time workload demands, available resources, and trust policies, communicating with IES instances using authenticated control messages.

The system of claim 1, wherein said I/O Switch Fabric:

a. enforces strict time-bound access to shared I/O devices, wherein access permissions are dynamically adjusted based on trust levels, resource availability, and real-time security assessments; and

b. utilizes unique, cryptographically verifiable identifiers associated with said IES instances to control and authenticate access to shared I/O devices, enhancing isolation and preventing unauthorized access.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a hardware-based I/O Monitoring Module that continuously tracks the status of all I/O operations across IES instances, reporting any anomalies or unauthorized access attempts to a Master Security Mesh (MSM) (Patent 2) using a secure communication channel (Patent 3).

The system of claim 1, further comprising:

a. a Multi-Layered Virtual Console (MLVC) that enables secure user interaction with multiple isolated IES environments via a unified display; and b. contextual Input and Output Redirection Protocols that dynamically route user input and output signals to the correct IES instance based on the active environment and trust policies defined in said TRCs.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a secure Resource Arbitration Module that manages resource borrowing requests based on trust levels, resource availability, and predefined security policies defined in the relevant TRCs, utilizing a declarative policy language for expressing resource allocation rules.

The system of claim 1, further comprising a secure Resource Return Protocol that:

a. verifies the state of returned resources after a borrowing period ends, including hardware-based integrity checks; and b. utilizes secure communication channels (Patent 2) for transmitting resource release notifications.

The system of claim 1, wherein said MCM:

a. discovers and selects multiple communication paths between IES instances based on path availability, performance metrics (latency, bandwidth), trust levels of intermediate nodes and zones, resource availability, and declarative resource borrowing policies; b. distributes resource borrowing and I/O traffic across said multiple paths using multipath routing protocols; and c. dynamically adjusts path selection and traffic distribution based on real-time network conditions, security assessments, and resource availability.

The system of claim 9, wherein said MCM integrates with the DTMS (Patent 4) to incorporate trust policies defined in said TRCs into path selection and management, and utilizes capabilities (Patent 2) to control access to resources and I/O devices over said multiple communication paths.

Patent 10: AI-Powered Predictive Resource Allocation and Adaptive Scaling for IES with Multipath Optimization, Declarative Policies, and Secure Sharing

Abstract:

This invention discloses an AI-powered system for predictive resource allocation and adaptive scaling of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) within a secure, zoned computing environment, enhancing performance, security, and resilience. The system utilizes an AI-based Predictive Resource Allocation Engine, analyzing real-time workload characteristics, security conditions, historical data, and trust policies, to dynamically allocate resources to IES instances. A Dynamic Scaling Mechanism autonomously provisions or de-provisions IES instances based on real-time demands and security policies, while maintaining hardware-enforced isolation. Furthermore, the system leverages multipath communication for optimized resource allocation and failover, dynamically adjusting resource distribution based on path availability and performance. A novel declarative policy framework enables flexible and expressive resource management, while a secure resource sharing protocol supports efficient and controlled sharing of idle resources between IES instances, utilizing dynamically generated capabilities and adhering to zone-specific trust policies. This integrated approach provides a robust, adaptable, and secure resource management solution for dynamic and evolving workloads.

Diagram:

graph LR

subgraph "AI-Powered Resource Management"

AI_Engine["AI-Based Predictive Engine"] --> |Dynamic Resource Allocation| IES_Cluster["IES Instances"]

AI_Engine --> |Adaptive Scaling| IES_Provisioning["IES Provisioning/De-Provisioning"]

end

IES_Cluster -.- |Real-Time Monitoring Data| AI_Engine

IES_Instance_1["IES Instance 1 (CPU, Memory, I/O)"] --> IES_Cluster

IES_Instance_2["IES Instance 2 (CPU, Memory, I/O)"] --> IES_Cluster

IES_Instance_3["..."] --> IES_Cluster

subgraph "Governance & Policy"

Security_Policies["Security Policies"] & Compliance["Compliance Requirements"] --> Governance_Framework["Governance Framework"]

end

Governance_Framework -.- |Policy Guidance| AI_Engine

Diagram Description:

AI-Powered Resource Management: The core subgraph contains the AI engine and its actions.
IES Instances: The IES Cluster subgraph shows multiple instances, each with its resource pool visualized.
Real-Time Monitoring: The dashed line from IES instances to the AI engine shows data flow.
Dynamic Resource Allocation: The arrow from the AI engine to IES instances represents resource adjustment.
Adaptive Scaling: The arrow to "IES Provisioning/De-Provisioning" represents scaling actions.
Governance & Policy: The "Governance & Policy" subgraph is loosely connected to the AI engine to show that policy guidance informs its actions.

Claims:

(Independent) A system for AI-powered predictive resource allocation and adaptive scaling of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) (Patent 1) within a secure computing system comprising a plurality of IES instances organized into a hierarchy of Zones (Patent 18), each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC) stored on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger (Patent 15), comprising:

a. an AI-based Predictive Resource Allocation Engine that analyzes real-time workload characteristics, security conditions, historical data, and trust policies defined in the relevant TRCs to dynamically allocate resources to individual IES instances, wherein said Engine monitors the status of multiple communication paths (Patent 2, Patent 3) and dynamically adjusts resource allocation based on path availability, security posture and performance metrics; b. a Dynamic Scaling Mechanism that autonomously and securely provisions or de-provisions IES instances based on real-time workload demands, available resources, security conditions, and trust policies, while maintaining hardware-enforced isolation between IES instances, utilizing a declarative policy language for expressing scaling policies; and c. a Trust-Aware Resource Optimization module that dynamically adjusts resource allocation and scaling decisions based on trust levels, resource availability, real-time security assessments, performance requirements and predefined security policies, derived from a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (Patent 4), and trust policies defined in said TRCs.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, further comprising a hardware-based Monitoring System that continuously gathers data on workload demands, security status, resource utilization, trust levels, and communication path performance, and provides real-time feedback to said AI-based Predictive Resource Allocation Engine.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said Dynamic Scaling Mechanism: a) ensures efficient resource utilization by securely creating new IES instances when needed and securely releasing underutilized instances to free up resources, according to the trust policies defined in said TRCs; and b) records all scaling actions on the decentralized, tamper-proof ledger (Patent 15), creating an auditable history of scaling operations.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, further comprising a Governance-Aware Scaling Framework that incorporates predefined security policies, compliance requirements, and trust policies defined in the relevant TRCs into the scaling decision-making process, wherein said Framework utilizes a declarative policy language and a distributed consensus mechanism (Patent 13) for policy approval and enforcement.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said Dynamic Scaling Mechanism employs hardware-enforced isolation measures, including capability-based access control (Patent 2) and secure boot procedures (Patent 1), to ensure that newly provisioned or de-provisioned IES instances remain physically and logically isolated from other existing instances.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, wherein said AI-based Predictive Resource Allocation Engine: a) analyzes historical data on security threats, resource usage patterns, and trust levels derived from the DTMS to proactively adjust resource allocation and scaling decisions in anticipation of potential threats or performance bottlenecks; and b) generates predictive models using a combination of historical data, real-time monitoring data, and declarative resource allocation policies specified in a policy language.

(Dependent) The system of claim 6, wherein said AI-based Predictive Resource Allocation Engine utilizes machine learning algorithms to refine predictive models dynamically based on feedback from the system's performance and security monitoring modules.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, further comprising a Resource Reconfiguration Module that dynamically adjusts resource allocation and scaling between IES instances based on real-time security assessments, performance requirements, and trust policies defined in the relevant TRCs, utilizing a secure, multipath communication mechanism (Patent 2, Patent 3) and hop fields encoding resource allocation updates, to exchange resource allocation updates and ensure reliable delivery of control messages.

(Dependent) The system of claim 1, further comprising a Secure Resource Sharing Protocol that allows IES instances to securely share unused or idle resources with other authorized instances according to dynamically adjustable policies and capability grants (Patent 2), wherein: a) authorization and resource access are managed by the DTMS (Patent 4), considering the trust levels of participating IES instances and the policies defined in the relevant TRCs; b) resource sharing policies are expressed using a declarative language and stored on the decentralized, tamper-proof ledger (Patent 15); and c) multiple secure communication paths are established and managed between IES instances for resource sharing using a multipath communication mechanism (Patent 22), enhancing fault tolerance and performance.

Patent Group IV. Secure User Interface and Chiplet Integration

Diagram:

graph LR

subgraph "ASKA System"

subgraph "Modular IES (Patent 1)"

IES_1["IES Instance 1 (Dedicated Resources)"]

IES_2["IES Instance 2 (Dedicated Resources)"]

IES_N["... IES Instance N"]

Resource_Manager["Resource Manager (Patent 9, 10)"]

IES_1 --> Resource_Manager

IES_2 --> Resource_Manager

IES_N --> Resource_Manager

end

subgraph "Secure UI Kernel (Patent 11)"

UI_Kernel["Secure UI Kernel (Hardware Isolation)"]

Multi_Region_Buffer["Multi-Region Display Buffer (Trust Levels)"]

Trust_Level_Mgmt["Trust Level Management Module (Dynamic Adjustment)"]

Input_Redirection["Context-Aware Input Redirection (Secure Routing)"]

UI_Rendering["Hardware-Accelerated UI Rendering (Dedicated Hardware)"]

Display_Validation["Hardware-Enforced Display Validation (Checksums, Signatures)"]

UI_Kernel --> Multi_Region_Buffer

UI_Kernel --> Trust_Level_Mgmt

UI_Kernel --> Input_Redirection

Multi_Region_Buffer --> UI_Rendering

UI_Rendering --> Display_Validation

Input_Redirection --> IES_1

Input_Redirection --> IES_2

Input_Redirection --> IES_N

end

subgraph "Modular Chiplet Architecture (Patent 12)"

Chiplet_Orchestration["Chiplet Orchestration Module (Resource Allocation, Workload Distribution)"]

Secure_Chiplet_Interface["Secure Chiplet Interface (Hardware-Enforced, Authentication)"]

Chiplet_Crypto["Chiplet 1 (Cryptographic Operations)"]

Chiplet_AI["Chiplet 2 (AI Acceleration)"]

Chiplet_IO["Chiplet N (Specialized I/O)"]

Blockchain_Provenance["Blockchain-Based Provenance Tracking (Tamper-Proof Record)"]

Chiplet_Orchestration --> Secure_Chiplet_Interface

Secure_Chiplet_Interface --> IES_1

Secure_Chiplet_Interface --> IES_2

Secure_Chiplet_Interface --> IES_N

Chiplet_Orchestration --> Chiplet_Crypto

Chiplet_Orchestration --> Chiplet_AI

Chiplet_Orchestration --> Chiplet_IO

Blockchain_Provenance --> Chiplet_Orchestration

end

subgraph "Secure Communication"

Secure_Comm_Bus["Hardware-Enforced Communication Bus (Unidirectional Data Flow)"]

IES_1 --> Secure_Comm_Bus

IES_2 --> Secure_Comm_Bus

IES_N --> Secure_Comm_Bus

Secure_Comm_Bus --> UI_Kernel

end

style Secure_Comm_Bus fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

style Secure_Chiplet_Interface fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Diagram Description:

This detailed diagram illustrates the intricate integration of Patent 11 (Secure UI Kernel) and Patent 12 (Modular Chiplet Architecture) within the ASKA system's architecture based on Patent 1 (Modular IES).

1. Modular IES (Patent 1): This section depicts multiple independent IES instances, each with dedicated hardware resources. A Resource Manager is included, highlighting the dynamic resource allocation and management capabilities, drawing from Patents 9 and 10. This section emphasizes the foundational isolated execution environments.

2. Secure UI Kernel (Patent 11): This section details the inner workings of the Secure UI Kernel, including: * Hardware Isolation: Emphasizing the complete separation of the UI kernel from the main processing environments. * Multi-Region Display Buffer: Each region has a dynamically adjustable trust level, enabling secure rendering of critical UI elements. * Trust Level Management Module: Adapts trust levels based on real-time security assessments, system events, and the origin of UI components. * Context-Aware Input Redirection: Securely routes user input to the correct IES instance. * Hardware-Accelerated UI Rendering: Leverages dedicated hardware for enhanced performance. * Hardware-Enforced Display Validation: Uses techniques like checksums and digital signatures to validate the integrity of rendered information.

3. Modular Chiplet Architecture (Patent 12): This section details the dynamic chiplet integration and management: * Chiplet Orchestration Module: This central module is responsible for detecting the insertion and removal of chiplets, managing resource allocation, workload distribution, and communication paths. * Secure Chiplet Interface: A hardware-enforced interface that uses a robust authentication mechanism to prevent unauthorized access. * Chiplets (Crypto, AI, IO): Illustrates diverse chiplets with specialized functions, enhancing system capabilities. * Blockchain-Based Provenance Tracking: Ensures the authenticity and origin of each chiplet are recorded on a blockchain, preventing counterfeit components.

4. Secure Communication: This section emphasizes the secure communication infrastructure. * Hardware-Enforced Communication Bus: Provides a secure, unidirectional communication path between the IES instances and the UI Kernel. This prevents unauthorized reverse communication.

Patent References:

Patent 1: Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) form the foundation of the architecture.
Patent 9 & 10: Resource management is implicitly shown through the Resource Manager.
Patent 11: The diagram illustrates the secure UI kernel, its multi-region buffer, trust level management, and input redirection.
Patent 12: This diagram details the Chiplet Orchestration Module and the secure integration of various chiplets.

Patent 11: Secure UI Kernel with Zonal Isolation, Hardware-Enforced Control-Flow Integrity, and Declarative Policy-Based Rendering

Abstract:

This invention introduces a secure user interface (UI) system for multi-kernel computing architectures, specifically designed for environments utilizing Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES). The system features a dedicated UI Kernel that operates in complete hardware isolation from the primary execution environments, ensuring that user interactions do not compromise the underlying system. A key innovation is the treatment of the UI Kernel as a separate ASKA Zone, with its own Trust Root Configuration (TRC) and access control policies, enhancing isolation and preventing interference from potentially compromised IES instances. The UI system employs a multi-region display buffer, with each region assigned a distinct, dynamically adjustable trust level, governed by declarative policies. Hardware-based validation mechanisms, including checksums and digital signatures, ensure the integrity of content rendered in each region. Furthermore, the UI Kernel incorporates hardware-enforced control-flow integrity (CFI) to protect against control-flow hijacking attacks, and critical UI Kernel services are implemented in hardware to minimize the trusted computing base (TCB). A secure, unidirectional communication bus connects the IES instances to the UI Kernel, enforcing data flow control and preventing reverse communication attacks. This comprehensive approach provides a robust and secure UI system resistant to various attack vectors, including control-flow hijacking and display-related attacks, while supporting dynamic trust management and policy-based rendering.

Diagram:

graph LR

subgraph "Secure UI Kernel (Patent 11)"

subgraph "Hardware Isolation Layer"

Dedicated_CPU["Dedicated CPU (Physically Isolated)"]

Dedicated_Memory["Dedicated Memory (Hardware-Enforced Segmentation)"]

Secure_Bus_Interface["Secure Bus Interface (Hardware-Enforced Access Control)"]

end

subgraph "UI Kernel Core"

UI_Kernel_Core["UI Kernel Core (Secure OS, Drivers)"]

Trust_Level_Manager["Trust Level Manager (Dynamic Policy Enforcement)"]

Input_Redirection_Module["Input Redirection Module (Context-Aware Routing)"]

Display_Buffer_Manager["Display Buffer Manager (Multi-Region Allocation)"]

UI_Rendering_Engine["UI Rendering Engine (Hardware Acceleration)"]

Security_Monitor["Security Monitor (Anomaly Detection, Integrity Checks)"]

UI_Kernel_Core --> Trust_Level_Manager

UI_Kernel_Core --> Input_Redirection_Module

UI_Kernel_Core --> Display_Buffer_Manager

UI_Kernel_Core --> UI_Rendering_Engine

UI_Kernel_Core --> Security_Monitor

end

subgraph "Multi-Region Display Buffer"

High_Trust_Region["High-Trust Region (Critical System Alerts, Authentication)"]

Medium_Trust_Region["Medium-Trust Region (Application Data, User Inputs)"]

Low_Trust_Region["Low-Trust Region (Background Processes, Non-Critical Info)"]

Display_Validation_Module["Display Validation Module (Checksums, Digital Signatures)"]

High_Trust_Region --> Display_Validation_Module

Medium_Trust_Region --> Display_Validation_Module

Low_Trust_Region --> Display_Validation_Module

Display_Buffer_Manager --> High_Trust_Region

Display_Buffer_Manager --> Medium_Trust_Region

Display_Buffer_Manager --> Low_Trust_Region

end

subgraph "External Interfaces"

Secure_Comm_Bus["Secure Communication Bus (Unidirectional Data Flow)"]

External_Input["External Input Devices (Keyboard, Mouse, Touch)"]

External_Display["External Display"]

UI_Kernel_Core --> Secure_Comm_Bus

Input_Redirection_Module --> External_Input

UI_Rendering_Engine --> External_Display

end

style Secure_Comm_Bus fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Diagram Description:

This diagram delves into the internal architecture of the Secure UI Kernel (Patent 11), illustrating its key components and their interactions. The diagram emphasizes the hardware isolation, multi-region display buffer, and dynamic trust management mechanisms.

1. Hardware Isolation Layer: This layer ensures complete physical and logical isolation of the UI kernel. * Dedicated CPU (Physically Isolated): A dedicated CPU prevents interference from other processes. * Dedicated Memory (Hardware-Enforced Segmentation): Physically isolated memory prevents unauthorized access. * Secure Bus Interface (Hardware-Enforced Access Control): Controls access to the system bus to prevent unauthorized communication.

2. UI Kernel Core: This is the central processing unit of the secure UI kernel. * UI Kernel Core (Secure OS, Drivers): A specialized operating system and drivers for secure UI management. * Trust Level Manager (Dynamic Policy Enforcement): Dynamically adjusts trust levels for different regions of the display buffer. * Input Redirection Module (Context-Aware Routing): Securely routes user input to the appropriate IES instance based on context. * Display Buffer Manager (Multi-Region Allocation): Manages the allocation of memory within the multi-region display buffer. * UI Rendering Engine (Hardware Acceleration): Utilizes dedicated hardware for high-performance UI rendering. * Security Monitor (Anomaly Detection, Integrity Checks): Continuously monitors the UI kernel for anomalies and ensures data integrity.

3. Multi-Region Display Buffer: This section highlights the key feature of the secure UI system. Each region has a defined trust level that determines the type of information it can display and the access privileges it has. * High-Trust Region (Critical System Alerts, Authentication): Displays highly sensitive information. * Medium-Trust Region (Application Data, User Inputs): Displays less sensitive data. * Low-Trust Region (Background Processes, Non-Critical Info): Displays non-sensitive information. * Display Validation Module (Checksums, Digital Signatures): Ensures the integrity of information displayed in each region.

4. External Interfaces: These components handle communication with external systems and devices. * Secure Communication Bus (Unidirectional Data Flow): Provides a secure unidirectional communication path to the main ASKA system, preventing any potential reverse attacks. * External Input Devices (Keyboard, Mouse, Touch): Handles user input. * External Display: Connects to the physical display.

Patent References: This diagram is specifically designed to detail the internal workings of Patent 11, focusing on the claims related to hardware isolation, the multi-region display buffer, and the dynamic trust management. The diagram’s structure and component call-outs reflect the key aspects of this patent.

This detailed diagram illustrates the internal design of the Secure UI Kernel, clarifying its security features and mechanisms. The diagram’s components and their connections help to understand how hardware isolation, multi-region buffer, and dynamic trust level management work together to provide a secure user experience. The layered approach and clear separation of concerns highlighted in the diagram contribute to the system's resilience and security.

Claims:

A secure user interface (UI) system for a computing environment comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) organized into a hierarchy of Zones, each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC) stored on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger, the UI system comprising:

(a) a dedicated UI Kernel operating in complete hardware isolation from said IES instances, said UI Kernel comprising: (i) a dedicated CPU and physically isolated memory with hardware-enforced segmentation, preventing unauthorized access from other components; (ii) a secure, hardware-enforced communication bus connecting said IES instances to said UI Kernel, enforcing unidirectional data flow from said IES instances to said UI Kernel; (iii) a multi-region display buffer, each region assigned a dynamically adjustable trust level based on the origin and sensitivity of displayed information, governed by declarative policies expressed in a policy language; (iv) a hardware-based Display Validation Module ensuring the integrity and authenticity of content rendered within each region of said display buffer, utilizing checksums, digital signatures, or a combination thereof; and (v) a hardware-enforced control-flow integrity (CFI) mechanism protecting the UI Kernel's execution flow from unauthorized modification or hijacking, said CFI mechanism integrated with access control policies based on program execution states.

(b) a Trust Root Configuration (TRC) specifically for said UI Kernel, said TRC stored on said decentralized ledger, defining a set of trust roots, trust policies, and access control rules for the UI Kernel and its associated Zone;

(c) a Policy Engine within said UI Kernel interpreting and enforcing said declarative policies, dynamically adjusting trust levels of display regions based on the origin of UI components, and controlling access to UI resources based on trust levels, capabilities (Patent 2), and TRC policies; and

(d) a Secure UI Integration Module facilitating secure communication between the UI Kernel and the ASKA Hub, leveraging the Secure Inter-Zone Collaboration Framework (SIZCF - Patent 22) for inter-zone communication and coordinating policy updates, wherein said module supports remote attestation of the UI Kernel using hardware-rooted trust mechanisms.

Dependent Claims:

The system of claim 1, wherein said declarative policies for UI rendering and access control are expressed using a policy language that supports at least one of: rule-based policies, attribute-based policies, or role-based policies.

The system of claim 1, wherein said UI Kernel’s TRC is signed by a designated authority within the ASKA system and verified during the secure boot process of the UI Kernel, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of the TRC.

The system of claim 1, wherein said Trust Level Manager dynamically adjusts trust levels for each display region based on at least one of: the origin of the UI component (e.g., which IES instance generated the component), the sensitivity level of the displayed data, real-time threat assessments from the Master Security Mesh (MSM - Patent 2), or policy changes from the ASKA Hub.

The system of claim 1, wherein said Display Validation Module utilizes a combination of checksums for data integrity and digital signatures for origin authentication, ensuring that displayed information is both untampered with and originates from a trusted source.

The system of claim 1, wherein the secure communication bus connecting IES instances to the UI Kernel enforces unidirectional data flow using data diodes (Patent 2), dedicated unidirectional network interfaces, or a combination thereof, preventing any communication from the UI Kernel back to the IES instances.

The system of claim 1, wherein said UI Kernel supports hardware-accelerated UI rendering using a dedicated graphics processing unit (GPU) or hardware-accelerated rendering engine, ensuring a responsive and efficient UI experience while maintaining isolation.

The system of claim 1, wherein at least a portion of critical operating system services within said UI Kernel are implemented in dedicated hardware, reducing the size and complexity of the trusted computing base.

The system of claim 1, wherein an Input Validation and Sanitization Module within the UI Kernel validates and sanitizes all user inputs before passing them to the designated IES instance, preventing injection attacks or malicious input from affecting the system's integrity.

The system of claim 1, wherein said UI Kernel integrates with an accessibility framework, ensuring compliance with accessibility guidelines and providing a usable interface for all users.

The system of claim 1, wherein said Policy Engine prioritizes the rendering of critical system alerts and authentication prompts, ensuring that high-priority information is always displayed in a timely and secure manner, even under high system load. This prioritization is enforced by pre-defined policies and managed by the Policy Engine.

The system of claim 1, wherein said secure communication between the UI kernel and other system components includes capabilities (Patent 2) to authorize data transmission and access control enforcement within the UI subsystem, with capabilities having limited lifetimes and being revocable for enhanced security.

Patent 12: Secure and Adaptive Chiplet Architecture with Dynamic Resource Allocation, Capability-Based Access Control, and Hardware-Enforced Isolation

Abstract:

This invention discloses a secure and adaptive chiplet architecture for dynamic application execution within secure computing environments, such as those utilizing Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES). The architecture integrates hot-swappable chiplets, each dedicated to specific computational tasks, with a secure, hardware-enforced interface enabling dynamic and authenticated integration and removal during runtime. A Chiplet Orchestration Module, leveraging AI-driven workload analysis and dynamic resource allocation, manages chiplet integration, resource assignment, and workload distribution. Furthermore, a capability-based access control system governs access to chiplet functionalities, enabling dynamic control over chiplet features based on trust levels, security policies, and resource availability. Integration with SIBRA (Patent 11) provides bandwidth reservation and QoS guarantees for individual chiplets, enhancing performance and preventing resource contention. A hardware-enforced isolation mechanism, combined with a Security Monitor, ensures secure chiplet operation and protects against unauthorized access or interference. This modular architecture provides enhanced flexibility, performance, and security for evolving workloads and emerging applications in dynamic and potentially hostile environments.

Diagram

graph LR

subgraph "Modular Chiplet Architecture (Patent 12)"

subgraph "Chiplet Orchestration Module"

Workload_Analyzer["Workload Analyzer (AI-driven, Real-time Analysis)"]

Resource_Allocator["Resource Allocator (Dynamic Resource Assignment)"]

Chiplet_Selector["Chiplet Selector (Optimal Chiplet Selection)"]

Power_Manager["Power Manager (Energy-Aware Chiplet Control)"]

Security_Monitor["Security Monitor (Anomaly Detection, Integrity Checks)"]

Blockchain_Manager["Blockchain Manager (Provenance Tracking, Authentication)"]

Workload_Analyzer --> Resource_Allocator

Workload_Analyzer --> Chiplet_Selector

Resource_Allocator --> Chiplet_Selector

Chiplet_Selector --> Secure_Interface

Power_Manager --> Chiplet_1

Power_Manager --> Chiplet_2

Power_Manager --> Chiplet_N

Security_Monitor --> Chiplet_Orchestration

Blockchain_Manager --> Chiplet_Orchestration

end

subgraph "Secure Chiplet Interface"

Secure_Interface["Secure Chiplet Interface (Hardware-Enforced, Authentication)"]

Secure_Comm_Channels["Secure Communication Channels (Dedicated, Isolated)"]

Authentication_Module["Authentication Module (Digital Signatures, Encryption)"]

Secure_Interface --> Secure_Comm_Channels

Secure_Interface --> Authentication_Module

Secure_Interface --> IES_1

Secure_Interface --> IES_2

Secure_Interface --> IES_N

end

subgraph "Chiplets"

Chiplet_1["Chiplet 1 (e.g., Cryptographic Accelerator)"]

Chiplet_2["Chiplet 2 (e.g., AI Accelerator)"]

Chiplet_N["Chiplet N (e.g., Specialized I/O)"]

end

subgraph "Secure Programming Framework"

DSL_Compiler["DSL Compiler (Domain-Specific Languages)"]

SDK_Integration["SDK Integration (Pre-built Functions, Libraries)"]

Secure_Debugging["Secure Debugging Tools (Protected Access, Monitoring)"]

end

IES_1["IES Instance 1"]

IES_2["IES Instance 2"]

IES_N["... IES Instance N"]

style Secure_Interface fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

style Secure_Comm_Channels fill:#ccf,stroke:#888,stroke-width:2px

Diagram Description:

This diagram details the internal architecture of the Modular Chiplet Architecture (Patent 12), emphasizing its key components and their interactions.

1. Chiplet Orchestration Module: This module manages the overall operation of the chiplet system.

* **Workload Analyzer (AI-driven, Real-time Analysis):** Analyzes workload characteristics to determine the optimal chiplet configuration.

* **Resource Allocator (Dynamic Resource Assignment):** Dynamically allocates system resources (CPU, memory, bandwidth) to chiplets based on workload demands.

* **Chiplet Selector (Optimal Chiplet Selection):** Selects the most appropriate chiplets based on workload analysis and resource availability.

* **Power Manager (Energy-Aware Chiplet Control):** Manages the power state of chiplets to optimize energy consumption.

* **Security Monitor (Anomaly Detection, Integrity Checks):** Continuously monitors the chiplet system for anomalies and ensures data integrity.

* **Blockchain Manager (Provenance Tracking, Authentication):** Manages the blockchain-based provenance tracking, authenticating the chiplets and verifying their integrity.

2. Secure Chiplet Interface: This interface ensures secure communication and access control for chiplets.

* **Secure Chiplet Interface (Hardware-Enforced, Authentication):** A hardware-enforced interface to prevent unauthorized access.

* **Secure Communication Channels (Dedicated, Isolated):** Dedicated, isolated communication channels for each chiplet.

* **Authentication Module (Digital Signatures, Encryption):** Uses digital signatures and encryption to verify chiplet authenticity and protect data in transit.

3. Chiplets: This section shows different types of chiplets with specialized functionalities.

* **Chiplet 1 (e.g., Cryptographic Accelerator):** A chiplet specialized for cryptographic operations.

* **Chiplet 2 (e.g., AI Accelerator):** A chiplet optimized for AI-related computations.

* **Chiplet N (e.g., Specialized I/O):** A chiplet for specialized input/output operations.

4. Secure Programming Framework: This framework simplifies chiplet development and integration.

* **DSL Compiler (Domain-Specific Languages):** Compiles code written in domain-specific languages for each chiplet type.

* **SDK Integration (Pre-built Functions, Libraries):** Provides pre-built functions and libraries to streamline the integration process.

* **Secure Debugging Tools (Protected Access, Monitoring):** Provides tools for debugging chiplets without compromising system security.

5. IES Instances: The diagram shows how multiple IES instances (Patent 1) can utilize the chiplet module.

Patent References: This diagram is a detailed illustration of Patent 12, specifically highlighting the modularity, secure interfaces, and dynamic management of the chiplet architecture. The components and their interactions reflect the claims made within the patent document. The use of blockchain for provenance adds an extra layer of security, protecting the system from malicious chiplets.

This detailed diagram clarifies the internal structure and operation of the Modular Chiplet Architecture (Patent 12). It illustrates the dynamic resource management, secure communication, and robust security features that enable secure and efficient execution of specialized functions. The modular design and ability to hot-swap chiplets make the system highly adaptable to changing needs and workloads. The integration with the IES architecture is clearly represented, highlighting the synergy between the two.

Claims:

(Independent) A modular chiplet architecture for a secure computing system comprising a plurality of Modular Isolated Execution Stacks (IES) organized into a hierarchy of Zones, each Zone associated with a Trust Root Configuration (TRC) stored on a decentralized, tamper-proof ledger, the architecture comprising:

(a) a plurality of hot-swappable chiplets, each chiplet dedicated to a specific computational task and having a secure cryptographic identifier, wherein said identifier is recorded on said decentralized ledger to ensure authenticity and provenance; (b) a secure, hardware-enforced interface enabling authenticated connection and disconnection of chiplets to/from an IES during runtime, utilizing at least one of: a challenge-response protocol, digital signatures, or other cryptographic authentication mechanisms to verify chiplet integrity and authenticity; (c) a Chiplet Orchestration Module that dynamically manages: (i) integration and removal of said chiplets; (ii) allocation of resources to said chiplets and IES instances based on workload demands, security policies defined in said TRCs, and real-time resource availability; (iii) distribution of workloads across said chiplets and IES instances; and (iv) secure communication between chiplets, utilizing dedicated channels and protocols, including hardware-enforced unidirectional channels (Patent 2) or capability-augmented PCFS channels (Patent 2), ensuring data integrity and confidentiality during inter-chiplet communication; (d) a capability-based access control system that manages access to chiplet functionalities based on dynamically issued and managed capabilities, wherein each capability grants specific access rights (read, write, execute) and address ranges to designated memory regions or functionalities within a chiplet, dynamically enabling or disabling chiplet features based on trust levels derived from a Dynamic Trust Management System (DTMS) (Patent 4), security policies defined in said TRCs, and resource availability; and (e) a hardware-enforced isolation mechanism, integrated with a Security Monitor, that isolates chiplet operations within a secure execution environment, preventing unauthorized access or interference between chiplets, or between chiplets and other system components, wherein said isolation mechanism utilizes at least one of: physically separate memory regions, dedicated communication channels, hardware-based access control lists (ACLs), or a combination thereof, and wherein said Security Monitor dynamically manages access control policies, resource allocation, and isolation boundaries based on policy updates from the DTMS and real-time threat assessments.

(Dependent) The architecture of claim 1, wherein said Chiplet Orchestration Module utilizes AI-driven workload analysis and dynamically adjusts resource allocation, workload distribution, and chiplet selection based on real-time system conditions and predictive models.

(Dependent) The architecture of claim 1, wherein said SIBRA (Scalable Internet Bandwidth Reservation Architecture) integration enables bandwidth reservation for individual chiplets and IES instances, wherein the Chiplet Orchestration Module dynamically reserves bandwidth based on workload demands, real-time resource availability, and trust levels derived from said DTMS and said TRCs to ensure quality of service (QoS) and prevent resource contention between chiplets.

(Dependent) The architecture of claim 1, further comprising a secure programming framework that supports the development and secure execution of chiplet-specific code within isolated execution environments, wherein said framework includes: (a) domain-specific languages (DSLs) tailored to the functionality of each chiplet type, abstracting complex hardware operations and providing secure programming constructs; and (b) secure software development kits (SDKs) providing pre-built functions, libraries, and tools for secure integration of chiplet functionalities.

(Dependent) The architecture of claim 1, wherein said chiplet architecture supports fault tolerance and redundancy through chiplet replication, allowing multiple instances of the same chiplet type to be integrated into an IES, and wherein the Chiplet Orchestration Module automatically detects and responds to chiplet failures, re-routing workloads to functioning chiplets and initiating replacement or recovery procedures.

(Dependent) The architecture of claim 1, further comprising a chiplet virtualization layer that enables multiple IES instances to securely share access to a single physical chiplet, wherein said virtualization layer provides isolation between IES instances, ensuring data security and preventing interference.

(Dependent) The architecture of claim 1, wherein chiplets can be provisioned and managed remotely through authenticated and encrypted communication channels (Patent 3), subject to access controls enforced by the DTMS (Patent 4), enabling remote updates, security patching, and configuration adjustments without physical access to the IES.

The architecture of claim 1, wherein the integration, removal, resource allocation, workload distribution, access control policies, and inter-chiplet communication for said chiplets are governed by zone-specific policies defined in the relevant TRCs, and wherein changes to said policies are managed through a distributed consensus mechanism (Patent 13) and recorded on the decentralized, tamper-proof ledger (Patent 15).

The architecture of claim 1, further comprising a remote attestation mechanism that verifies the integrity and authenticity of each chiplet before integration, wherein said attestation process utilizes a combination of hardware-rooted trust and remote attestation protocols.